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Abstract 
 
China is almost unanimously being portrayed as the most important ally of the military junta 
in Burma. The notion that Burma is turning into a vassal state of China is not uncommon; it 
has even been suggested that Burma is becoming the 24
th
 province of China, and that China is 
the puppet master of Burma.  Do these descriptions depict a realistic picture of Sino-Burmese 
relations?  If not, what is then the genuine nature of the relationship?  
 China and Burma share not only a lengthy border, they also share a long history.  The 
Burmese have drawn a lesson from this history, which a little tabloid and perhaps a bit 
overstated, can be summed up in the words of a former Burmese Ambassador to China: ―Han, 
Manchu, Nationalist, Communist – it makes no difference to the Burmese. A Chinese is a 
Chinese – and to be feared.‖ 
Chinese foreign policy has recently shown a gradual shift from an absolute support of pariah 
states such as Burma, to a more pragmatic approach, taking international reputation and soft 
power into consideration when dealing with these states. Being associated with regimes such 
as the Burmese is becoming a reputaional burden for Beijing. Furthermore, instability on the 
Burmese side of the border has grave consequences also on the Chinese side. Combined with 
the economic illiteracy of the Burmese military junta which is impeding bilateral trade, these 
factors are making Beijing increasingly frustrated with the Burmese regime. At the same time 
Burma remains strategically important for China, especially for future Chinese energy 
security. Burma on its side, is reliant on China for countering the negative consequences of 
Western sanctions and for diplomatic protection. Burma has a history of neutrality, and 
remained neutral during the cold war.  Continuing this line of non-alignment, Burma has 
actively sought to diversify its international partners, and now counts big international players 
as ASEAN, India and Russia among its partners. This is all reducing dependency on China.   
The thesis concludes that although China is one of, and perhaps the most important ally of the 
military junta Burma,  the notion that Burma is becoming a Chinese vassal state is highly 
unrealistic. The incentives that has led China to support the Burmese junta is slowly 
changing, and this may in turn subtly modify the Chinese attitude towards Burma‘s current 
regime.  
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Note on the use of place names 
 
The Burmese military government in July 1989 changed the country‘s name, from ―the Union 
of Burma‖ to ‗the Union of Myanmar‘. Whereas ‗Burma‘ is derived from the Burmese word 
bama, the colloquial name for the main ethnic group in Burma, ‗Myanmar‘ is derived from 
the literary version of the same word, myanma.
1
 At the same time a number of other place 
names were changed to conform better to the original Burmese pronunciation.   
 These changes were subsequently adopted by the United Nations, and a variety of 
international organisation, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF).  The Burmese opposition has rejected to recognize the name alteration, arguing that 
the regime lacks the legitimacy to rename the country and its cities. Some nations, like the US 
and Great Britain have followed this line and refused to accept the name changes.   
 This study will use the old and better known names, like Burma instead of Myanmar, and 
Rangoon instead of Yangon as these are more broadly understood.  Quotations and references 
will be cited as they were originally published.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Burmese is a language having diglossia, i.e, there is a significant difference between the spoken (low) version 
and the literary (high) version.  (Ammon, 2006,  Sociolinguistics: An international handbook of the science of 
language and society  Vol 3,  p.2012) 
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Introduction 
“May I propose a toast for the long-lasting 
 Sino-Myanmar pauk-phaw friendship” 
Li Jinjun, Chinese Ambassador to Burma,  
June 9
th
 2005 
2
 
 
 ―On November 7 [2010], Burma held general elections as scheduled  in a steady and smooth 
manner.‖ 3 These are the words of China‘s Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hong Lei, 
speaking of the same elections that American President Barack Obama described as 
―anything but free and fair‖.4  UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon stated that the elections, 
which resulted in a massive, rather unsurprising victory for the pro-junta party USDP, was 
held in conditions that were ―insufficiently inclusive, participatory and transparent‖.5 
 China has long had a different view on Burma than that of the West, and, as an editorial in 
the Chinese newspaper Global Times points out: ―The West have continuously exerted 
pressure on China regarding the Burmese problem, often accusing China of playing an 
‗immoral role‘ in Burma‘s move towards democracy.‖  6  
 Burma is normally sparsely covered in the international media, save major occurrences, such 
as the December 2010 release of democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi, and the massive 
demonstrations in September 2007, somewhat optimistically termed ‗the Saffron Revolution‘. 
The protesters, headed by the Burmese monks, instantly gained massive and extensive global 
support, and questions were raised as for what the world could do to improve the situation for 
the Burmese people.  China was by many singled out as the main obstacle to an effective and 
                                                 
2
 See Li, Jinjun, Speech of Ambassador Li Jinju on the Reception of Celebrating the 55th Anniversary of the 
Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between China and Myanmar, Embassy of the People‘s Republic of 
China in the Union in Myanmar, June 9
th
 2005 
3
 Hong Lei, Foreign Ministry Spokeperson Hong Lei‟s regular press conference, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the People‘s Republic of China Nov 9th  2010 
4
Beech, Hannah,What's Next for Burma Opposition After Elections?, Time Magazine Nov. 8
th
 2010 
5
 Nesikry, Martin, Spokesperson for UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, Myanmar polls insufficiently 
inclusive, participatory and transparent, Secretary-General says, Nov. 8
th
  2010 
The USDP won 76 % of the Parliamentary Seats. For an overview of the election results, see  
Democratic Voice of Burma,  Final election results announced, Nov. 18
th
 2010  
6环球时报, 社评：周边国家应支持缅甸稳定,2010 年 11月 9 日 
[Global Times, Editorial:Neighbouring countries should support stability in Burma, Nov. 9
th
  2010]  
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united international approach, and the criticism even contained voices advocating a boycott of 
the 2008 Beijing Olympics should China not cease its support for  the Burmese junta.
7
 
 China has for the last two decades been perhaps the most reliable partner for the Burmese 
regime. To justify this claim, analysts can point to ―Beijing‘s significant past transfers 
of arms to the ruling military government, growing Chinese–Myanmar economic 
exchanges, and China‘s role as a diplomatic backer‖ 8of the Burmese military junta. 
 
Ties between Beijing and the Burmese authorities started to grow especially close after the 
1988 uproar in Burma and the Tiananmen incident in Beijing the following year, and China is 
almost unanimously being portrayed as the most important ally of the military junta in 
Burma. The notion that Burma is turning into a vassal state of China is not uncommon, 
9
 it 
has even been suggested that Burma is becoming the 24
th
 province of China, 
10
 and that 
―China is the puppet master of Burma.‖11    
 As a notorious violator of human rights, Burma has numerous times been on the agenda of 
the United Nations. And as a permanent member of the Security Council (UNSC), China‘s 
voice is sure to be heard.  In January 2007 China vetoed a resolution criticizing human rights 
violations in Burma; one of only 7 times China has used its veto power in the UNSC 
12
 , 
underlining the importance Beijing attaches to its relationship with the generals in Naypidaw.    
This could of course also imply that Beijing regards Burma as central to its own sphere of 
interest. However, the geographic diversity of resolutions encompassed in China‘s veto 
record makes it hard to see any coherence. 
13
  
                                                 
7
 See for instance,  Reuters, EU should boycott Beijing Olympics over Myanmar, Sept 27
th
 2007  
8
 Haacke, Jürgen, ―China‘s role in the pursuit of security by Myanmar‘s State Peace and Development Council: 
boon and bane?‖ The Pacific Review, Vol. 23 No. 1 March 2010: 113–137 
9
See for example   
Von Hartenberg, Donata , A marriage of (in)convenience, Al-Jazeera, Nov 10
th
 2010,  
Washington Post, China‟s muscular embrace of Cambodia Nov 20th 2010 
Setkyar Hein, The United Nations has a duty, Burma Digest, July 25
th
, 2007 
Boot, William, China hedges its Energy bet with move into Bangladesh, The Irrawaddy Sept. 2
nd
 2009 
Bo Kyaw Nyein, Thinking outside the box, Mizzima, June 21
st
 , 2009  
10
 Boucaud, André and Louis Boucaud,  Burma – a 24th province for China, Le Monde Diplomatique, Nov. 2006
  
 
11
 Stated by Vice President of the European Parliament Edward McMillan-Scott, see 
Spencer, Richard , China‟s Dilemma over Burma prostests, The Telegraph, Sept 26th 2007   
12
 A record of vetos in the UNSC pre-2004 can be found at the UN webpages,  see 
United Nations,  Record of vetos in the UNSC pre-2004, (annex III) 
For records post-2004, see  
United Nations, Meeting conducted/ actions taken by the Security Council  
For the sake of comparison, the US has vetoed 82 UNSC resolutions. See 
(Wade, Francis, Concern greets new Security Council arrivals, Democratic Voice of Burma, Oct.14
th
 2010)  
13
 China has vetoed resolutions concerning Zimbabwe (July2008) Macedonia(Feb 1999),  Central America 
(Jan1997) For references, see footnote no 12 and 13. 
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 One of the core tenants of modern Chinese foreign policy is the doctrine of non-interference, 
and the implementation of this has led China to be regarded as somewhat irresponsible in 
dealing with repressive states.
14
  China referred to this principle when explaining the veto in 
the UNSC in January 2007, and Chinese adherence to this principle is thus evidently an 
obstacle to gain Chinese support for multilateral action against Burma. 
Interestingly, the view that Burma is turning into a client state for China, implicitly disregards 
the Chinese emphasis on non-interference. The notion that China is absolutely unwilling to 
intervene in Burmese affairs, unilaterally or multilaterally, seemingly builds on the extreme 
opposite prerequisite; that China due to its strict reverence for the same principles will refrain 
from engaging in any sort of interference.   
 This paper will examine Sino-Burmese relations, the extent of China‘s support of the present 
Burmese regime and  to what extent the Burmese generals rely on this Chinese support.   
Western media and politicians have a tendency to simplify the relations between the two 
nations, and this study is an attempt to contribute to a broader understanding of this 
relationship, and in the process review central elements in both Chinese and Burmese foreign 
policy.  
Since the 1988 Burmese upheaval and the 1989 Tiananmen confrontation, the relationship to 
China has undoubtedly been a cardinal pillar in Burmese foreign relations. Western 
misconceptions of the Sino-Burmese relationship can have serious consequences, in the sense 
that it could lead to an unsuitable approach to the ‗Burmese problem‘, i.e. an undemocratic, 
totalitarian government relentlessly violating the rights of its citizens.  
 The study will not discuss whether a Western approach, i.e economic sanctions and 
diplomatic pressure, is the most appropriate to bring about democratic reforms in Burma, 
neither will it discuss the possibility of a democratic change in Burma should China align 
more closely with the West‘s policies towards Burma. Furthermore, the thesis is not seeking 
to reach any conclusion as for whether China is likely to interfere in Burma or not, but rather 
put forth indicators for these possible future scenarios. It also aims, through illuminating 
various aspects of Sino-Burmese relations, to assess how best to understand the relationship 
between the two states.  The essay will explain why Burma is important to China and vice 
versa, why China has proved such a reliable partner for the Burmese junta, and why China‘s 
influence in Burma is not as comprehensive as commonly believed.  To determine how 
influential Beijing is in internal Burmese affairs is obviously a task that can get no definite 
                                                 
14
 See Gill, Bates, China becoming a responsible stakeholder  
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answer and no specific measure. What is feasible though, is to lay down a number of 
indicators, such as economic cooperation, historical bonds, cooperation in international fora, 
strategic interests, variations in allies, and based on these, to estimate the degree of influence  
China in reality has in Burma. This study is thus based on second hand information, 
interpretations and analyses.  
 
 For not basing the thesis exclusively on Western literature and perceptions, I have strived to 
also draw on available Chinese sources. The databases China Academic Journals and China 
Online Journals have been indispensable for the task of finding relevant scholarly Chinese 
articles on the subject. Literature in the bibliography containing Chinese characters was 
written in Chinese.  All information obtained from these sources has been translated by me, 
and any flaws in the translation should hence be accredited to the candidate. 
The online Burmalibrary (Burmalibrary.org) has been very useful in obtaining interesting and 
insightful articles and reports on Burmese affairs, wheras articles from newspapers mostly 
have found their way to the thesis through the all-encompassing, positively and negatively, 
tool of google.  The literature used during research undoubtedly shapes the content and 
argument of any thesis, and it is a challenge to find the best possible sources, and to find 
voices with authority within a specific field.  I have tried, especially on the sections where my 
prior knowledge has been limited, such as on Burmese history, to use literature which has 
been widely quoted in other scholarly work.  I am therefore rather confident that the sources 
used here are reputed and respected.  Another problem concerning the sources and the 
argument of this thesis is the political aspect of the topic and the possible politicized nature of 
literature on the subject. Questions of historical and present day bilateral relationships will 
inevitably be subject to different political interpretations, and political views may easily 
colour opinions on the matter. This is true for the Chinese literature, and it is of course also 
true for Western and Burmese analyses.  It is my hope that this paper will depict the nature of 
the Sino-Burmese relationship as accurately and unbiased as possible, all the time 
acknowledging that the conclusions reached do not necessarily reflect the one and only Truth. 
I do believe however, that the assumptions made are based on substantial material, and hence 
could contribute to a broader understanding of Sino-Burmese relations.  
 International relation theory will not be dealt with extensively in this thesis, as it does not 
have a purely theoretical approach to foreign policy and bilateral relations.
15 
This may of 
                                                 
15
For explanations on various international relation theories, see for instance 
 Linklater, Andrew (ed), 2000, International Relations – Critical concepts in Political Science vol IV, Routledge,  
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course narrow the scope in which we understand China and Burma‘s foreign policies, but for 
the aim of this paper, investigating the extent and nature of Sino-Burmese relations and how 
this aligns with wider ideas in Chinese foreign policy it should be sufficient.  Moreover, a 
rigidly theoretical investigation of a bilateral relationship could limit a comprehensive 
understanding, as the theory could become a straightjacket in which to suit actual 
observations and actions that may deviate from the theory. This study is thus primarily an 
empirical analysis of the bilateral relationship between  China and Burma, based on the 
underlying assumption that states act out of self-interest, in line with the international relation 
theory of political realism (Moseley, Alexander, Political Realism). 
  
 Burma holds importance for China first and foremost as a junction and an outlet to the Indian 
Ocean, highlighted by the current construction of an oil-pipe from the Burmese coast to the 
Chinese province of Yunnan, estimated to provide approximately 60 % of China‘s imported 
oil when finished in 2012.
16
   Its contribution to future Chinese energy-security is, obviously, 
of enormous significance.  However, the close association with the Burmese regime is 
becoming a reputational burden for Beijing, who is being dragged through the mud whenever 
the Burmese junta receives attention from the international community.  As China‘s power 
grows, so does the international expectation that China should act as a responsible 
stakeholder.
17
  The leader of the Nobel Committee, Torbjørn Jagland, exemplified this when 
announcing Liu Xiaobo the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize laureate, stating that ‗China‘s new status 
must entail increased responsibility‘.18  
 The negative international attention is not the only issue disturbing Beijings relations with 
the generals in Burma. Mismanagement on the Burmese side of the Sino-Burmese border-
area causes problems on the Chinese side of the border, and the economic illiteracy of the 
Burmese junta is having negative consequences for bilateral trade.  This is all making Burma 
a thorny issue for Beijing.  
 I will start with a brief historical outline of relations between China and Burma, so as to give 
                                                 
16
 Approximately 75 % of China‘s imported oil comes from the Middle East and Africa, and about 80% of this is 
estimated to be transported through the Burmese pipeline after its construction, equalling a rough 60% of total 
imports.  
See 张洁，‖中国能源安全中的马六甲因素‖，国际政治研究 2005 年第 3 期  
[Zhang, Jie, ―The Malacca Strait factor in Chinese energy security‖, International Political Research, no 3. 2005] 
and Wai Moe, Chinese Premier coming to Burma, The Irrawaddy, May 20
th
 2010 
17
 The term ‗responsible stakeholder‘ in relation to China was first coined in 2005 by the then American Deputy 
Secretary of State, Robert Zoellick. See Zoellick, Robert B.  From the Shanghai Communique to “Responsible 
Stakeholder”,  Peterson Institute, May 2nd  2007  
18
Norwegian Nobel Committee (The), Announcement: The Nobel Peace Prize for 2010 
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a historical backdrop for the present day relationship.  The assumed suzerain-vassal relation 
between the two states seems to be a matter of controversy, rather than the historical fact 
arguers of a return to a suzerain-vassal relationship appear to assume. Besides, historical 
disputes have  led to a rather substantial Burmese scepticism towards its big northern 
neighbour. Following this historical review, Chinese foreign policy will be the focus of 
attention, emphasizing the principles of sovereignty and non-interference, and their 
implications for Sino-Burmese relations. PRC‘s historical attitudes towards these principles, 
and the manner in which Beijings shifting view of core self-interest has led to different 
implementations of the same principles will also be illuminated. The recent Chinese focus on 
soft power and international reputation will then be discussed, with the aim of examining if 
and how this might affect Chinese policies in Burma.  We will then shed some light on 
Burmese domestic circumstances, and how these are influencing the politics of the Burmese 
leadership, before we turn to the present day Sino-Burmese relationship and the factors 
affecting it.  After first examining Chinese diplomatic support of the SPDC,  we will look into 
Burma‘s role in securing China‘s future energy supplies, before illuminating economic 
relations and how instability on the Burmese side of the border is having consequences also 
for the Chinese.  
 Chinese ambassador Li Jinjun at the very beginning of this introduction toasted the ‗pauk-
phaw‘ friendship of Burma and China. When emphasising the proximity and the good nature 
of the relationship between China and Burma, both Burmese and Chinese officials and media 
frequently uses this Burmese word (translated 胞波, baobo in Chinese), meaning cousins, or 
brothers. However, as this thesis will demonstrate,  in the kinship of Sino-Burmese relations, 
Burma is better described as China‘s troublesome little brother.19 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
19
 ‗China‘s troublesome little brother‘ -  A term taken from Aung Zaw, founder and editor of the renowned 
magazine for Burmese affairs, the Irrawaddy Magazine.  See 
Aung Zaw, China‟s troublesome little brother, The Irrawaddy, Sept. 2009  
12 
 
 
1: China and Burma – a historical overview 
 
China‘s relations with the outside world, especially with her neighbouring countries, have 
historically been determined by the Chinese notion of China‘s centrality and cultural 
supremacy. (Fairbank, 1968, p.2) 
The Chinese tended to think of their foreign relations an as external expression of the social 
order within the country, and China‘s foreign relations were hence hierarchic and 
nonegalitarian (ibid).  Bordering nations, and nations beyond, were expected to accept 
Chinese superiority by paying tribute to the Chinese emperor. (ibid, p4)  Situated beyond the 
ethnically diverse and somewhat peripheral province of Yunnan, Burma was, unlike other 
neighbouring nations like Vietnam and Korea, outside the sphere of direct Chinese cultural 
influence.  As we shall see, the nature of the historical relationship between China and Burma 
remains a disputed topic.  Chinese and Burmese sources are conflicting, painting different 
pictures of relations between the nations.   
  
The Burmese kingdom of Pagan was one of the mightiest kingdoms ancient Southeast Asia 
ever experienced, and at its height it ruled an area from the present day Burmese-Indian 
border to central Thailand, from the Yunnanese border to the Malay Peninsula.   
In 1271, Narathipahapati, infamously named ‗King Dog‘s Dung‘ by his people due to his 
ruthlessness, was king of Pagan.  After the Mongols had conquered the Southern Song 
dynasty in China, Kublai Khan sent instructions to his viceroys to demand tribute and 
allegiance from Southeast Asian kings, and in 1271 the viceroy of newly occupied Yunnan 
received orders to claim tribute from Pagan. (Htin Aung, 1967) The first envoy sent by the 
Mongol emperor to collect tribute was executed by the Burmese king, and when the Yuan 
dynasty sent an army set to invade Burma in 1283 Narathipahapati fled to Bassein in the 
south of Burma, where he sent an envoy to Yunnan to offer his submission to the emperor of 
the Yuan dynasty. He was later remembered by the Burmese as ‗Taruppye‘ (or Tarokpyemin), 
'he who fled from the Chinese'. 
20
 This was not to be regarded as an honorary title, and shows 
the Burmese sense of self-awareness and disdain for those succumbing to foreigners, in this 
case the Mongols/Chinese.  
                                                 
20
 Interestingly, the Burmese term Tarok/Taoyk initially referred to the Mongols, but later came to carry the 
meaning Chinese. For a discussion on early Burmese perceceptions of  the Chinese, see  
Goh Geok Yian, ―The question of ‗China‘ in Burmese chronicles‖,  Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, 41(1), 
pp 125–152 February 2010. 
13 
 
 Through most of Chinese history, Burma has been regarded as a vassal.  The correctness of 
this standpoint remains disputed, but  what remains undisputed is that the Qing dynasty 
launched several missions to conquer Burma in the 18
th
 century.  At the height of Qing 
power, Emperor Qianlong launched several missions to subdue the Burmese, and between 
1765 and 1770 China invaded Burma numerous times, in what professor Yingcong Dai calls 
the most disastrous frontier war that Qing ever fought.
21
  Dai writes, ‗not only did one after 
another commander-in-chief of the Qing dynasty fail to conquer Myanmar, but the Qing 
troops also suffered extremely heavy casualties‘ (ibid). In late 1769 a truce was reached, the 
invading Qing army failing to conquer Burma.  Following the truce, Qing troops kept a heavy 
military lineup along the Yunnan-Burmese border, in order to impose a ban on inter-border 
trade.  According to Chinese documents the content of the truce agreement was that the 
Burmese would have to send a tributary mission every tenth year, return all detained Chinese 
soldiers and officers, and never again intrude the border.
22
  Burmese sources on the other 
hand, recorded that the Qing army should retreat, that there would be a restoration of border 
trade and that every tenth year a mission should be dispatched for the keeping of good 
relations.
23
  Qing and Burma resumed diplomatic contacts in 1790, which provided Chinese 
Emperor Qianlong with a pretext to proclaim victory in the prolonged conflict.  In 1792, in 
the emperor‘s ‗Yuzhi Shiquanji (In commemoration of the ten complete military victories)‘, 
Qianlong included the failed Burmese campaign among his other successful frontier 
campaigns. （Dai, Yingcong, 2004） 
 Burmese historian Htin Aung has a theory regarding the reason why Qianlong was so sure 
the campaign in Burma was successful, and how the Chinese started to perceive Burma as a 
vassal state:   In 1787 an envoy arrived in the Burmese capital, offering valuable presents and 
respectful greetings from the ‗East King‘, i.e the Chinese Emperor Qianlong. At the end of 
the letter from the alleged Chinese Emperor, was a passage asking the Burmese king to send 
an envoy to China.  This he did, and in 1788 a Burmese envoy carrying presents, including 
precious jewellery and elephants arrived in the Emperor‘s capital.  On October the 2nd  the 
same year,  Qianlong gave audience to three Burmese envoys, and accepted what he regarded 
                                                 
21
 Dai, Yingcong, ―A Disguised Defeat: The Myanmar Campaign of the Qing Dynasty‖, Modern Asia Studies 
Vol 38, No 1 2004 
22何新华, “试析清代缅甸的藩属国地位问题”, 历史档案 2006 年 1 期 
 [He Xinhua, ―Analyzing the question of  Burma‘s position as vassal state during the Qing Dynasty‖ Historical 
Archives, no I 2006] 
 “缮具表文, 十年进贡一次”、“还所拘絷官兵”以及“永不犯边 Originally from《清高宗实录》卷
848, 中华书局 1985—1987 年影印本, 第 17—18 页 
23Ibid, ‗清军撤退、恢复双方贸易和每十年遣使通好‘, Originally from 哈维《缅甸史》下册, 商务印书馆
1973 年版, 第 453、479、566 页 
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as a Burmese tributary mission to the Qing dynasty. (Htin Aung, 1967) Chinese sources 
recorded of the Burmese mission arriving in the Beijing court in 1788, in the 55th year of 
Qianlong, that ‗[they] wished [the emperor] longevity, presented domesticated elephants and 
asked for a title‘. 24  Qianlong granted the envoy with an imperial letter, imperial edict and 
bestowed the Burmese king with the title Mengyun (孟云), in addition to stipulate that Burma 
should present tribute every tenth year. 
25
  China and Burma from this point on had, according 
to Chinese sources, formally established a tributary relationship, and all Chinese material 
hereafter refers to this ‗once in every tenth year‘ when describing the two countries‘ tributary 
relations.
26
  For the Burmese, however, it is common knowledge that Burma never accepted 
the suzerainty of the Qing Emperor (Htin Aung, 1967).  
 Htin (and Dai, who quotes Htin), offers an explanation for this difference of interpretations. 
According to them, the first Chinese mission to the Burmese king in 1787 was a bogus 
mission staged by local traders living in the border areas. They were suffering under the inter-
border trade ban and were eager to improve the strained relationship between the Burmese 
and China. Consequently, in order to end the trade-ban, Htin Aung argue, the traders sent a 
bogus mission to the Burmese king.  (Htin Aung, 1967 p.199)  They supposedly arranged the 
disappearance of the Burmese king‘s own interpreter during the return trip to China, and 
replaced him with one of their own. Then, as the mission arrived before the Qing emperor, the 
conspirators explained that the Burmese king was bringing tribute.  (ibid, p. 200) True or not, 
in 1790 Qianlong lifted the ban on trade in the border areas.   
 As aforementioned, Qing from 1788 constantly regarded Burma as one of her vassals, and a 
number of Burmese ‗tributary missions‘ is recorded in Qing documents. 
Clearly though, these missions didn‘t show up at the Qing court ‗once every tenth year‘ as 
scheduled, but rather at seemingly random intervals.  He Xinhua has made the following 
overview of Burmese tribute-envoys to China based on ―The Draft History of Qing‖, (清史
稿), ―The Qing Veritable Records of the Five Emperors‖（五帝’清实录’） and 
―Decrees and regulations of Qing‖ (大清会典事例). 
                                                 
24
He, Xinhua, 2006, ―表贺万寿, 贡驯象, 请封号‖ Asking for a title (请封号), was done in order to be granted 
a ‘title‘ and thereby acknowledged by the Chinese emperor.  Originally from 《清史稿》卷 15“高宗本纪”, 
中华书局 1977 年版, 第 547 页 
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ibid, 乾隆皇帝赐敕书、诏书, 册封孟云为缅甸国王, 并规定贡期为“十年一贡”.  
 Originally from《清史稿》卷 528“缅甸”, 中华书局 1977 年版, 第 14661—14689 页。  
26
 ibid,   中、缅形式上的朝贡关系在此时才正式建立。此后在中国的各种官方文献中, 都把“十年一贡
”作为缅甸进贡中国的贡期。不过, 从实际的交往来看, 缅甸来华次数远远超过了“十年一贡”的规定 
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--Table listing alleged Burmese tributary missions to the Chinese court.-- 
Chinese 
imperial 
calendar 
Qianlong, 
year 53, 
55(two times 
) 56, 57, 60 
Jiaqing, year 
5, 16  
Daoguang, 
year 3, 13, 
14, 23, 24  
Xianfeng, 
year 3 
Guangxu, 
year 1 
Gregorian 
calendar 
1788, 
1790(two 
times) 1791, 
1792, 1793, 
1795 
1800, 1811 1823, 1833, 
1834, 1843, 
1845 
1853 1875 
Total number 7 2 5 1 1 
Translated from He Xinhua, 2006  
 
 The term tribute had a tendency to be applied rather loosely in Chinese records. John 
Fairbank points out that economic relations could only be formally permitted within the 
political framework of the tributary system, and that ―even if the foreigner did not actually 
comply with the forms of tribute, the terminology of tribute would be applied to him in the 
Chinese record nevertheless‖ (Fairbank, 1968, p.4).  This further complicates the conclusion 
of Burma‘s role in the Chinese tributary system, as the terminology of Chinese records can 
not be entirely trusted. 
 The rather unclear question of Qing suzerainty over Burma also came to involve a third 
party. As the British in the 19
th
 century conquered and colonized Burma, the question of 
Chinese suzerainty became a question of dispute between China and Britain.
27
 Qing was not 
at all excited by the idea of having the British Empire at their borders, and in 1885, at the eve 
of the third Anglo-Burmese war, offered to mediate in the conflict between Burma and 
Britain. China suggested they could urge the Burmese to apologize and yield to British 
demands, and hence avoid a British occupation of Burma.  (He, Xinhua, 2006) 
The Qing court wrote that ‗Burma is a tributary state just on the border to Yunnan, and if the 
British plans [to occupy] the north of the country, it is not only the vassal state which will 
suffer. We worry that they will enter our ‗stable‘ [i.e. country], and we have to prepare a plan 
                                                 
27
The British conquest and colonization of Burma went through 3 Anglo-Burmese wars before the British 
effectively ruled Burma. The first war ranged from 1924 to 1926 and saw the Burmese cease the regions of  
Assam, Manipur (both in present day India), Tennassarin and Arakan to Britain.  After the second Anglo-
Burmese war in 1852 Britain annexed the province of Pegu, and after the third war in 1885 completed the 
conquest of Burma.  For a thorough explanation, see   
Htin Aung, 1967, A history of Burma, ch.10-11, and 
 林锡星，”缅甸历史分期探析”，东南亚研究，2002 年第 5 期 
[Lin, Xixing, ―An analysis of the period classification of Burmese history‖, Southeast Asia Studies, vol 5. 2002] 
16 
 
to take precautionary measures. 
28
  As the British carried out the war against Burma, China, as 
suzerain, offered to apologize to Britain on behalf of Burma. Britain argued that China did not 
have any suzerainty over Burma, and found academic basis for this in official Burmese 
records from the court of Ava (the Burmese capital), which stated that Burma presented 
China with presents but did not offer tribute. 
29
 Qing did however not become directly 
involved when Britain occupied Burma, and Burma did not, unlike Korea and Vietnam when 
faced with intrusion from respectively Japan and France, call on China for help.  Burma 
called on Germany, France and Italy. This indicates that Burma certainly did not regard itself 
as a Chinese vassal in the same way as Vietnam and Korea, and the rather passive Chinese 
response suggests that Qing did not regard Burma as particularly important for the Chinese 
empire. Additionally, the realization that direct confrontation with Great Britain almost 
certainly would be unsuccessful, probably also played a decisive role for a Chinese dynasty 
that was starting to realize the technological and military inferiority of China. In this period 
the Chinese view on its vassal states and the ideological system which upheld this system 
became subject of revision within China.  In 1879 minister Li Hongzhang‘s (李鸿章)  
assistant Xue Fucheng (薛福成) issued a book called ‗My Humble Opinion on Foreign 
Matters‘ (筹洋刍议) wherein he worded a new trend in Chinese political circles; to regard 
policies concerning the  tributary states from the angle of national security and not, as before, 
a matter of China‘s so-called superiority and centrality.30  In his book, Xue argues that 
different vassals should be treated differently, that ‗the ones whom we must protect, we must 
protect resolutely; the ones we must abandon, we must actively abandon‘.31 He lists 6 
countries as tributary states, Korea, Okinawa, Vietnam, Siam (Thailand), Burma and 
Nanzhang (南掌 in present day Laos) (Ibid). Further Xue argues that Chinese relations with 
Korea, Okinawa and Vietnam were ‗very close‘, and that these countries should therefore be 
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He, Xinhua, 2006 :   “缅甸为朝贡之邦, 与云南接壤。英人图其北鄙, 不独属国受患, 尤虑逼进吾圉, 
不可不豫筹布置, 为未雨绸缪之计” Originally from  《清德宗实录》卷 216, 中华书局 1985—1987 年
影印本, 第 4 页. 
The character 圉 yu3 normally translates as stable, or horse stable, but can also mean enclosure. I find it 
probable that in this particular sentence, it refers to the country, or  the borders which encloses the country.  The 
phrase 吾圉  resembles the common Chinese way of referring to their country, 我國, woguo, and the圉 yu3 
could also simply be a miswriting of the character 國. 
29
Ibid ,英国外务部“据缅甸史书但称馈送中国礼物, 并无进贡表文”   Originally from 王彦威《清季外
交史料》卷 69, 故宫博物院 1932 年刊本, 第 26、25 页。 
30吴宝晓,” 清季藩属观念调适与边疆政策变化”，清史研究，2002 年第 3 期 
[Wu, Baoxiao, ―Adjustments in the concept of vassal states  and changes in border areas policy during late 
Qing‖, Studies in Qing History，vol 3. 2002]   
31
Ibid :  ’[薛福成]„ 主张根据属国和中国的不同关系, 区别对待, 该保护的坚决保护, 该放弃的主动
放弃’.   
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protected, whereas China was ‗just preserving relations‘ with Burma, Siam and Nanzhang, 
and subsequently the tributary relations with these countries should cease.
32
  Interestingly, 
Burma is described as both a state paying tribute to Qing, and as a country that China was 
‗just preserving relations‘ with. This demonstrates the somewhat complex and blurred system 
of tributary relations, and further shows Burma‘s rather peripheral position in this system. Not 
everyone supported Xue Fucheng‘s new and pragmatic way of dealing with the tributary 
states. Chinese minister (公使) in England, Zeng Jize(曾纪泽) , in 1886 explained his 
viewpoints in the book ‗Discussions on China‘s sleep and awakening‘ (中国先睡后醒论). He 
argues that China should strengthen control of  her vassal states, and that if any of her vassals 
suffered intrusion from western powers ‗China must regard this country as wanting to 
abandon friendly relations with us and take to arms‘ 33. However, even if this notion of 
strengthening control of China‘s vassal was quite widespread at the time, it was mainly 
focused on reinforcing control of Korea and Vietnam, and  this prioritization was also 
prevalent within the Qing foreign ministry (ibid). 
 The nature of the historical relationship between China and Burma remains blurred. Dr. 
Laichen Sun sums it up precisely, having examined the relationship from the 9
th
 to the 19
th
 
century. ―Throughout the whole period under question, China consistently regarded Burma as 
one of her vassals. Burma, however, considered herself as China‘s equal.‖ 34 Sun also 
underlines that Burma, unlike Korea and Vietnam, did not use Chinese characters when 
communicating with China. This is interesting, as it demonstrates that Burma was not as 
heavily influenced and sinified as these other states neighbouring China.   
 The question of Burmese vassalship to China remains open, and speaks of two countries with 
different views on their common past.  Let us now turn to more recent history, and look into 
the relationship between Burma and China in the four decades following the establishment of 
the People‘s Republic of China.   
 
1.1 PRC-Burmese relations 1949-1989 
 
In the 19
th
 century, Burma was being incorporated into British India, and China had more 
                                                 
32
 Ibid   
33
 Ibid ‖如果欧美列强―有侵夺该藩属土地, 或干预其内政者, 中国必视此国为欲与我弃玉帛而事干戈矣。
Originally from 《啸亭杂录》卷 5,“缅甸归诚本末”, 中华书局 1980 年版.  
34
Laichen Sun,  Suzerain and Vassal, or Elder and Younger Brothers: The Nature of the Sino-Burmese 
Historical Relationship, 1997.  Laichen Sun holds a Ph.D in Southeast Asian History from the University of 
Michigan. He is presently associate professor at California State University. 
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than enough keeping western powers at arm‘s length.  World War II saw large parts of China 
and Burma occupied by the Japanese.  After first siding with the Japanese against the British 
colonialists, the Burmese fought alongside the British after Japanese pledges of Burmese 
independence had been abandoned (Htin Aung, 1967, p.301). Following independence in 
1948  Burma quickly adopted a neutral foreign policy, refusing to align with either the 
western bloc or the communist bloc (Johnstone,1963 ). The Burmese neutralism was duly 
noted by the Chinese as well, and released documents from the Chinese Foreign Ministry 
explains the Burmese policy of neutralism as follows: ―On one side, Burma is bordering 
China, and hence do not dare to side with the imperialists [the West] and make China an 
enemy. At the same time, when Burma is having controversies with the imperialists, they 
want the support of China and the Soviet Union.  (…) On the other hand, the ruling class in 
Burma (…) is to a relatively large degree depending on the imperialists.‖ 35 
 Following World War II and the subsequent Chinese civil war, the remains of the Chinese 
Nationalist army withdrew to Burma. The Burmese authorities were worried that China 
would use this as a pretext to invade the country and in cooperation with the Burmese 
communists overthrow the government.
36
    
 At the beginning of the 1950‘s Burma was home to roughly 350.000 Chinese, and the 
Burmese suspected China would use these as 5
th
 columnists.
37
  The fear of a forthcoming 
Chinese invasion has been put forth as the reason why Burma on December 17
th
 1949 was the 
first non-communist country to recognize the new China, just a month and a half after Mao 
proclaimed the establishment of the People‘s Republic of China.38  The Burmese uneasiness 
regarding China can clearly be seen in the words of former Burmese prime minister U Nu, 
comparing China to an elephant and Burma to a lamb, underlining that ‗whether the elephant 
gets angry or not is undoubtedly of great concern to the lamb.‘39  The Burmese fear seems 
rather understandable, as according to Chinese sources, China in this period regarded the 
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 范宏伟，‖从外交部解密档案看中缅关系中的华侨问题‖ 南洋问题研究,2007 年第 1 期  
[Fan, Hongwei, ―Assessing the question of overseas Chinese in Sino-Burmese relations through deciphering 
documents of the Foreign Ministry‖, Southeast Asian Affairs, no.1 2007] 
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 程瑞声，‖从中缅关系看五项原则的强大生命力‖,亚非纵横 2004 年第四期 
[Cheng Ruisheng, ―Looking at the great vitality of the five principles (of peaceful co-existence) from the angle 
of Sino-Burmese relations‖, Afro-Asian review, 4th issue, 2004 ]    
Author Cheng Ruisheng is former Chinese ambassador to Burma and India.   
37
 Fan, Hongwei, 2007 
38
 Ibid  
39
 Ibid  “缅甸总理吴努曾[...]表示：‘中国好比大象，缅甸好比羔羊，大象会不会发怒，无疑会使羔
羊提心吊胆。’” 
U Nu was the first Prime Minister of independent Burma, and served in three different periods, the third of 
which ended with the military coup in 1962.    
19 
 
newly independent Burma as being merely a ‗lackey of the imperialists‘, and the relationship 
is being described as ‗full of suspicion and distrust‘. 40  Interestingly, there is little evidence of 
serious Burmese concern over the establishment of Chinese control over Tibet in 1950. 
Rangoon seemed eager to  guard Burmese neutrality, though expressing regret concerning the 
Chinese actions.
41
 Similar considerations can be seen in Burmese reactions to China‘s 
involvement in the Korean War, when Burma refused to brand China an aggressor at a 
January 1951 UN meeting (ibid). Eager to show that China would not be a military threat to 
its neighbour, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai in June 1954 visited Burma, and together with his 
Burmese counterpart U Nu issued a joint statement declaring that the ‗5 Principles of 
Peaceful Co-Existence‘ would henceforth act as fundament for the Sino-Burmese 
relationship.
42
  These 5 principles have remained a central pillar in Chinese foreign policy, 
and will be further discussed later in the paper.  December the same year, U Nu visited 
Beijing and met Mao Zedong who, seemingly to assure the Burmese premier of Chinas non-
aggressive intentions, stated that ‗the wars of the past, when the Yuan dynasty and the Qing 
dynasty invaded Burma was all China‘s wrong.‘ (ibid). In a further move to appease concern 
of intrusion, China and Burma in 1960 signed the ‗Sino-Burmese border treaty‘, where 
previous disagreements about the borderline were solved.
43
 Moreover, the same year they 
also signed the Sino-Burmese Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression (中缅友好
和互不侵犯条约), the first of its kind in Asia.  Zhou Enlai stated that the treaty marked a 
new stage in relations between China and Burma, and ―was a victory for the peoples of the 
two countries.‖  (Vang, 2008).  The treaty consolidated the Five Principles as fundament for 
relations between the two nations, something that can be observed in article four of the treaty, 
which said, ‗The contracting parties declare that they will develop and strengthen the 
economic and cultural ties between the two states in a spirit of friendship and cooperation, in 
accordance with the principles of equality and mutual benefit and of mutual non-interference 
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 U Thant, then Secretary of the Burmese Information Ministry, later UN Secrecary General, November 1950 
asserted that ―Our country has not the least desire to take sides on the Sino-Tibetan affairs but (…) theBurmese 
government cannot but regret that the Central People‘s Government of China should have seen fit to take this 
drastic action on Tibet. (Johnstone, William C. ,1963, p.162)  
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 [China Net, China and Burma solved the border dispute peacefully, by exchanging territory, Aug. 28
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 2009]  
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in each other‘s internal affairs.‘ (ibid ).  
 In 1962 the Burmese military headed by Ne Win took power in Burma, and relations with 
China changed for the worse (Lintner, 1992)  China was then worried the Burmese would 
change its neutral foreign policy, and gradually stepped up its support for the Burmese 
Communist Party (Rüth, 2005). In a move seemingly to ensure continued friendly relations 
after Ne Win‘s takeover, China and Burma in February 1964 issued a joint communiqué in 
which both sides expressed the desire to establish and maintain friendly relations with all 
countries on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence (Vang, 2008, p.388).  In 
this period, in the immediate decades following the establishment of the People‘s Republic, 
when China was weak and had relatively few friends, Beijing made efforts to build relations 
with neighbouring countries to secure diplomatic recognition and ensure peace along its 
border. 
44
  This is clearly seen in its relations to Burma, as China deployed significant 
resources to strengthen its relationship with the Burmese, as exemplified by Chinese Prime 
Minister Zhou Enlai visiting Burma a total of nine times between 1954 and 1965.
45
  However, 
Burmese scepticism towards China did not vanish.  Burma had been invaded before, and with 
reference to the Qing invasion two centuries earlier and the existing presence of Chinese 
Nationalist soldiers on Burmese soil, the Burmese ambassador to China in 1960 stated:  ‗Han, 
Manchu, Nationalist, Communist – it makes no difference to the Burmese. A Chinese is a 
Chinese – and to be feared.‘ (Butwell, 1963, p .177). Evidently, even as both nations tried to 
improve relations with each other, and numerous measures were taken in order to do this, 
uncertainty and distrust of the big northern neighbour remained apparent in Burma.  The 
relatively good relations between PRC and Rangoon lasted till the Cultural Revolution made 
its way into Chinese foreign policy in the late 1960‘s.  By then China was actively seeking to 
‗spread the revolution‘, and openly supported the struggle of Communist Party of Burma 
(CPB) .
46
   There is however som controversy regarding the extent of Beijings support of the 
CPB. It has been reported that the CPB received financial aid and support from China, 
47
 and 
some claim that CPB soldiers was trained by the Chinese.
48
 Furthermore, Maung Zarni, a 
Burma expert at the London School of Economics has suggested that Chinese soldiers even 
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participated in actual battles against the Burmese armed forces. 
49
 This issue remains 
disputed, and a previously secret CIA report from 1971 argues that the Chinese support for 
CPB was not as comprehensive as commonly believed.  ‗Despite many suppositions and 
rumours that the Chinese were providing covert aid to the Communist insurgents (in Burma), 
Peking is not known to have supplied any material assistance prior to 1967, other than some 
portable radio equipment.‘50  The report further states that CCP mostly were providing CPB 
with ‗propaganda support‘ (ibid). After 1967, the report argues, Chinese support of the CBP  
increased, but most of the Chinese support was channeled to various ethnic insurgent groups 
(ibid).  It is difficult to estimate the extent of Chinese support to the CPB in the 50‘s through 
to the 70‘s, but it remains clear that there was some level of support.     
 In Burma the Chinese support for the Burmese communists led to an increased scepticism 
towards China, manifested above all in the extensive anti-Chinese riots in 1967, and 
following this, the prohibition of all Chinese-language education in the country, even private 
evening classes (Fan, Hongwei, 2006).
51
 Prior to this, in 1964, all Chinese-language 
publications had been forced to shut down.
52
 Burmese mistrust towards China was grave, and 
in March 1969 Burma notified Beijing of the termination of the previously signed Sino-
Burmese treaty of Friendship and Mutual Non-Aggression.   
 In the 1970‘s relations gradually improved, especially after Deng Xiaoping came to power in 
1978 and introduced a more pragmatic Chinese foreign policy.  (Lintner, 1992)  Later, the fall 
of the Berlin wall, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the end of the cold war led to a 
radical transformation of the established world order. In the midst of this, events in Burma 
and China would bring the two countries closer than they had ever been, and it has been 
argued that Burma would slowly move away from  ‗neutralism‘ as the central tenet of its 
foreign policy, and start ‗leaning on China‘53.  The development and characteristics of the 
post-89 Sino-Burmese relationship will be further discussed later in the paper.  Let us now 
turn to Chinese foreign policy, and its consequences for the Sino-Burmese relationship. 
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2:  Chinese foreign policy and its implications for Sino-Burmese relations 
 
The Myanmar issue is mainly the internal affair of a sovereign State. […] 
It is also our consistent position that the internal affairs of Myanmar should be handled 
mainly and independently by the Myanmar Government and people themselves through 
consultation. The international community can offer all kinds of constructive advice and 
assistance, but should refrain from arbitrary interference. Based on the above principled 
position, China strongly opposes the inclusion of Myanmar on the agenda of the Council, and 
is firmly against adopting any Security Council resolution on Myanmar 
Wang Guangya – Chinese UN ambassador, UNSC, January 12th  2007 54 
 
 
 One of the most important realities in contemporary international relations is the fast-
growing power of China, and an international system where conduct and regulations 
predominantly have been shaped and determined by Western powers will have to adapt to the 
rise of The Middle Kingdom. A rising China and its foreign policy will inevitably influence 
international relations, not to mention regional relations. Therefore, understanding Chinese 
foreign policy is crucial for comprehending the frame in which Chinese policy towards 
Burma takes place, and examining China‘s policies towards Burma may in turn illustrate 
aspects of Chinese foreign policy in general.  
 I will examine briefly the changes in PRC foreign policy, and have chosen to distinguish 
three periods of modern China. These are the Mao period, from 1949 to 1976, the Deng 
Period encompassing 1978 through to 1989, and then the post 1989 period.  It may be argued 
that this is a too simplistic, but I argue, along with Suisheng Zhao
55
 that the main pivot points 
in PRC foreign policy have been the shift from a ideology-based foreign policy under Mao to 
the pragmatism of Deng Xiaoping, and later the change spurred by the end of the cold war 
and shift in international attitude towards China after the crackdown of the Tiananmen 
protests June 1989. Especially when focusing on Chinese policies regarding non-interference 
and dealings with pariah-states, such a three-fold distinction seems meaningful, as clearly 
identifiable changes in Chinese attitude towards these states observably have occurred in 
these periods.  Furthermore, the almost categorical Chinese support of pariah states appears to 
have changed in recent years, as the Chinese approach to non-interference and sovereignty 
                                                 
54
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has altered (Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small, 2008, p. 38).  This change, as the next chapter will 
argue, is due to altered Chinese notions of self-interest. The country‘s emergence as a great 
power impels China to behave more responsibly,both because Beijings interests will align 
closer to those of the developed nations
56
, and because China seeks a favourable international 
reputation and recognition as a responsible power. This period, starting in 2005-2006, might 
be labelled a fourth period of Chinese foreign policy. 
 In the citation at the beginning of this chapter the Chinese UN Ambassador made clear 
China‘s principled position that ‗the international community [...] should refrain from 
arbitrary interference‘, stating that ‗the Myanmar issue is mainly the internal affairs of a 
sovereign state‘.  The Ambassador here touches upon two main pillars in Chinese foreign 
policy, namely sovereignty and non-interference. These two concepts have served as a 
foundation for relationships between China and pariah states, but are slowly changing along 
with a shift in Chinese perceptions of its interests.   These two concepts will be discussed 
next, followed by a historical overview of how the PRC has related to and enforced these 
principles in the temporal periods of Chinese foreign policy. 
 
2.1 Non-interference and sovereignty 
 
 
The main responsibility of Chinese foreign policy is to safeguard the nation‟s sovereignty, 
safety and developmental interests, so as to fully create a society where everyone has a 
relatively good standard of living. 
57
  
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People‘s Republic of China   
 
The concepts of sovereignty and non-interference have been central aspects of Chinese 
foreign policy since the establishment of the People‘s Republic in 1949. It is however  
important to remember that the concept of sovereignty is, of course, not uniquely Chinese.  
The history of state sovereignty as we think of it today, commenced at the peace of 
Westphalia in 1648, after which interference in other state‘s governing prerogative became 
illegitimate (Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy, Sovereignty). As for the PRC‘s 
conventional understanding of sovereignty, it serves multiple purposes; it legitimizes CCP‘s 
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absolute authority of Chinese territory and refutes foreign meddling in disputed topics like 
those of Taiwan and Tibet, and deflects criticism of its domestic policies (Gill and Reilly, 
2000, p1,  in Hegseth, 2009).  
When defining sovereignty, the words of Lassa Oppenheim
58
 serves as an important reminder 
that definitions not always are absolute; ‗There exists perhaps no conception the meaning of 
which is more controversial than that of sovereignty. It is an indisputable fact that this 
conception, from the moment when it was introduced into political science until the present 
day, has never had a meaning which was universally agreed upon. ‗59 Even though there 
might not be one, universally agreed definition of the concept, sovereignty also has a core 
meaning, namely ‗supreme authority within a territory‘. (Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy, Sovereignty) A sovereign state is in other words a free and independent state, 
which has undivided jurisdiction over all persons and property within its territory. Other 
nations can not rightfully interfere in a sovereign state‘s domestic affairs (The Columbia 
Electronic Encyclopedia, Sovereignty). International fora have embraced the idea of 
sovereignty, and it is perhaps the most central aspect of the international system.  The UN 
general assembly in 1970 adopted the Friendly Relations Declaration, stating that ‗No state or 
group of states has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the 
internal or external affairs of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and all other 
forms of interference or attempted threats against the personality of the State or against its 
political, economic and cultural elements are in violation of international law.‘60  This 
understanding of sovereignty has later been questioned by advocates of the opinion that 
international law is binding, even within sovereign states. And in recent decades, sovereignty 
has also been circumscribed by institutions like the EU, the UN's practices of sanctioning 
intervention, and the international criminal court (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy).  For 
these reasons, at least partly, the notion that ‘because states are limited by treaties and 
international obligations […] the absolute freedom of a sovereign state is, and should be, a 
thing of the past,‘ is generally accepted in current international practice (The Columbia 
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Electronic Encyclopedia). The Chinese view of sovereignty could be said to stick more 
rigidly to the more orthodox understanding of the concept, something which can be seen in 
Chinese emphasis on the Five Principles for Peaceful Co-existence.  As mentioned earlier, the 
Five Principles were first formulated in the Sino-Indian-Burmese treaties in June 1954
61
, and 
has served as cardinal pillars in Chinese foreign policy since.  The concept of sovereignty lies 
at the very heart of the Principles, which read:  
 
(1) Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; 
(2) Mutual nonaggression; 
(3) Mutual non-interference in internal affairs; 
(4) Equality and mutual benefit; and 
(5) Peaceful co-existence62 
 
The Chinese implementation of the Five Principles has sometimes meant an acceptance and 
protection of despotic and illegitimate regimes scorned by the West.  Chinese support for 
regimes such as the Sudanese and the North Korean is well known.  And when Robert 
Mugabe in February 2010 held his 86
th
 birthday in the Chinese embassy in Zimbabwe‘s 
capital Harare, China‘s support for pariah states was once again broadcasted to the world.63 
The leadership of Cuba, Venezuela and Iran, not regimes held in high regard in Western 
political circles, have all enjoyed friendly relations with China, 
64
 and this is also true for the 
generals of Burma.  As I hope to show, the categorical Chinese support of these regimes has 
changed in recent years, as Chinese approach to non-interference and sovereignty has altered, 
and China has become more integrated into international fora and structures. Carlson 
observes the same tendency, arguing that the policies of the PRC in the last decade have 
shown a less strict adherence to the principles of sovereignty and non-interference, and 
corresponded more closely with liberal international practice (Carlson, 2006 p.221).  Let us 
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now look closer into some cases exemplifying this trend. 
 
2.2 New trends in Chinese approach to pariah states 
 
The perhaps most evident example of the shift in Chinese foreign policy Carlson refers to, is 
the way China in 2006 played a vital role in persuading the Sudanese government to allow 
international forces to be deployed in Darfur (Gill, China becoming a responsible 
stakeholder). Sudan and China had enjoyed friendly relations for a long time, but after the 
outbreak of the conflict in Darfur in 2003 and the government of Sudan were accused of 
severe human rights violation, the international community strongly urged China to use its 
influence in Sudan responsibly.  After receiving heavy criticism in western media; it was even 
suggested to boycott the 2008 Beijing Olympics over China‘s involvement in Sudan, 65 China 
in June 2007 helped persuade Khartoum to allow UN and AU forces in the country (Hegseth, 
2009 p.94). Fear of hurting its international reputation has been highlighted as the main factor 
explaining China‘s constructive role in Sudan.  66 The role of international reputation and why 
this is important in Chinese foreign political thinking will be further discussed in the chapter 
on national reputation and soft power.   
 Further indicators of China‘s foreign policy conforming to more liberal views on sovereignty 
and non-interference can be seen in how Beijing strongly denounced North Korea‘s nuclear 
test in October 2006, and in 2007 and 2010 voted to impose and then strengthen sanctions on 
Iran. 
67
  China also played a role when Zambia held elections in 2006. Leader of the Zambian 
Party Patriotic Front, Michael Sata, had a highly critical stance towards the Chinese 
involvement in the country, and China threatened to halt investments in Zambia should Sata 
win the election.
68
  Beijing also, according to Sata, financed the campaign of his opponent, 
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the more China-friendly Zambian President Levy Mwanawasa. 
69
 As Sata himself received 
financial support from Taiwan, the Chinese support for his rival may not be seen as neither 
very surprising nor reprehensible.  It does however, show the Chinese willingness to use its 
influence in internal political affairs of other nations.   
Whereas the example from Darfur seemingly could be the result at least partly of 
international pressure and Chinese concern for its global image, the latter case from Zambia 
demonstrates that Beijing does not adhere inflexibly to the principle of non-interference even 
in absence of international pressure.  Yet another illustration of this shift in policy is seen in 
Beijing‘s growing support for UN peacekeeping operations. From 1997 to 2007 China‘s 
contribution in terms of manpower to UN Peacekeeping activities saw a near 20-fold 
increase, from about 50-60 observers in 1997 to over 1800 troops in 2007 (Gill, 2007), 
making China the second largest supplier of personnel to UN missions among the permanent 
members of the Security Council in 2007 (Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small, 2008).   
 China seems to have begun to adopt a more liberal view on sovereignty and non-interference, 
but what drives this change of approach? Carlson argues that any given state‘s stance on 
sovereignty and intervention is primarily the product of subtle shifts in the manner in which 
leaders attempt to realize fairly static interests.  Self-interest decides choice of stance; 
politicians use sovereignty when it suits their larger interests, and disregard it when such 
interests change due to new incentives.  (Carlson, 2006, p221)   
 It appears that China‘s new role as a major international power is changing the incentives 
that led Beijing to initially endorse the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence. Being an 
international power, the eyes of the world will pay more attention to how China is applying 
its new found power.   With greater power also comes an increase in the potential ability to 
influence both foreign countries and processes in international fora.  As Chinese global 
influence increases, the consequences of China‘s actions will be felt internationally in a way 
they haven‘t been before, and the manner in which China is using this influence will 
subsequently inevitably gain more of the world‘s attention.  With growing power comes 
expectations of a responsible international attitude, reflected in the words of the Leader of the  
Nobel Committee, Torbjørn Jagland when announcing Liu Xiaobo the 2010 Nobel Peace 
Prize laureate; ‗China‘s new status [as a world power] must entail increased responsibility‘.70   
With a bigger international focus, the reputational burden of supporting pariah states 
increases, and new incentives to be accepted as a responsible power emerges.   
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Chinese strenuous efforts to undermine the ‗China threat theory‘ and the recent focus on ‗soft 
power‘ testify to a Beijing increasingly aware of the importance of her reputation.  This 
aspect will be discussed after the next section, which will focus on the historical changes in 
the PRC‘s perception of self-interest since 1949, and how this has altered the implementation 
of the Five Principles and the tenets of sovereignty and non-interference. Following changes 
in Chinese leadership and strategic thinking, Beijing‘s approach to sovereignty and non-
interference has undergone coherent adaption.  
 
2.3 PRC‘s historical attitudes towards sovereignty and non-interference 
 
Under no pretext should any country meddle in another country‟s internal affairs, not to 
mention use one‟s strength to insult the weak, invade, bully or subvert (governments in) other 
nations. We don‟t impose our social system or ideology onto others, and we don‟t allow other 
countries to impose their social system and ideology onto us.  Every country has the right to 
choose a social system and ideology that conforms to the situation in that country. 
[…] The development of China does not constitute a threat to any country.  Hereafter, as 
China develops, [we] will never seek hegemony.  Chinese has themselves suffered aggression, 
repression and bullying at the hands of more powerful nations, and [we will] never impose 
the same suffering onto others.   
President Jiang Zemin at the 15th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,  
Point 9, 1997 
71
   
 
China‘s rhetoric on the principles of sovereignty and non-interference is deeply rooted in the 
Chinese ‘century of shame‘, which ranges roughly from the first opium war in 1842 to Mao 
declared the birth of PRC in October 1949.  The unjust interventions China suffered at the 
hands and guns of Western nations and Japan in the 19
th
 and 20
th
 century are still a thorn in 
the claw of the Chinese dragon. Apart from being manifested in the media, there are 
textbooks, novels, museums, songs, films and parks all devoted to commemorating the 
national humilation. (Callahan, 2010, p.1)  After suffering defeats in the two successive 
opium wars, China was forced to open ports for trade on terms dictated by Britain. For a 
nation which for most of its history was perhaps the world‘s highest developed civilization, 
this was a strong blow to national confidence. The defeat to Japan in the first Sino-Japanese 
war at the end of the 19
th
 century was another major humiliation, and when western powers 
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entered and looted Beijing in the wake of the Boxer rebellion at the very start of the 20
th
 
century, it was once again apparent that the Chinese were severely inferior in terms of 
military strength and technological development. Finally, the inability to withstand the 
Japanese in the second Sino-Japanese war in the 1930‘s through 1945 was yet another proof 
of Chinese inferiority. 
 The words of Jiang Zemin cited in the beginning of this section, reflect China‘s painful 
memories of a time when the Chinese nation was suffering intrusion and interventions by 
alien countries, emphasising that China will ‗never impose the same suffering onto others‘.  
Chinese emphasis on sovereignty and non-interference is deeply rooted in its own modern 
history.  Nevertheless, despite the painful experience of having been victim to foreign 
suppression (or perhaps because of this), China was in the 1950‘s through to the 70‘s, 
involved in a number of conflicts on alien soil. In this period, Beijing supported a number of 
movements in pursuit of national independence from the western powers, and was directly or 
indirectly involved in several wars, including in Korea and Vietnam, Zimbabwe and 
Mozambique (Christensen, 2006 and Snow 1994, p. 289 in Risa, 2009).  The Chinese in this 
period was actively involved in promoting communism globally and supported a number of 
communist movements, of which its support of the Cambodian Khmer Rouge perhaps is the 
best known. The Chinese support for the Communist Party of Burma has already been 
mentioned. Supporting communist movements was in the years following the establishment 
of the People‘s Republic, a policy actively advocated by the Chinese leadership. This is 
illustrated in by Liu Shaoqi, vice-chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, who in 1950 
stated that ―it is CCP and Chinese people‘s duty-bound international responsibility, and one 
of the most important means strengthening China‘s revolutionary victory in the international 
circumstances to use all possible measures to aid Communist Parties and peoples in oppressed 
Asian nations, and struggle for their liberations.‖ 72 Chinese foreign policy was during the 
reign of Mao based mostly on ideology and little on economic gain (Robinson 1994: 556 in 
Risa). The ideological aspect was in this period clearly more crucial to China than non-
interference, and Beijing actively pursued a policy based on the aim of promoting the 
Communist cause. 
 It was only when Deng Xiaoping took power that the PRC changed its political objectives 
from spreading global communist revolution to creating domestic economic growth, and its 
policies changed from inflexible principle to pragmatism (ibid).  China suspended its support 
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of Maoists insurgencies around the world, and its approach to diplomacy also became ‗non-
ideological‘.  (Kleine-Ahlbrandt, and Small, 2008) . However, ideology will inevitably 
influence policies and diplomacy of any country; conducting diplomacy completely detached 
from your nation‘s ideology, that being capitalism or communism, democracy or autocracy, is 
impossible.  I interpret the term ‗Non-ideological‘ in this context  to mean that ideology did 
not serve as the main (or only) tenant in China‘s foreign policy anymore, but was subjected to 
other goals, such as economic gain.  Economic growth, which in the Mao era had been 
subjected to ideological concerns, required investment capital, technology and human 
resources, and also markets for a growing export industry. ―All of this was scarce in China 
and its traditional allies, but available in Western countries. In this [post-Mao] period China 
therefore started a policy of opening up to the West‖ (Shirk 2007: 19 in Risa 2009). 
 As a consequence of political principles and ideology being replaced by market economic 
principles, the categorical support for ideologically similar regimes and movements were 
replaced by respect for the serving regime of any country, regardless of its ideology (Snow 
2008: xviii in Risa 2009, p29). This change in Beijing‘s policy held substantial consequences 
also for Burma. Chinese support for communist movements, including the Communist Party 
of Burma (CPB), decreased significantly after the death of Mao in 1976 (Lindtner, 1990), and 
was a significant factor in the collapse of the CPB in 1989 (ibid). Having a good relationship 
to other nations was now of more importance to Beijing than the spread of communism. 
 After 1989, a year remembered for both the fall of the Berlin wall and the brutal crackdown 
of the protesters at Tiananmen Square, the world of international relations changed.  The 
bipolar world of US and Soviet struggle for world domination was no more.  Amidst the 
changing world situation China found herself increasingly marginalized by western sanctions 
following the Tiananmen incident.  This led to a resurgence of Chinese political relations to 
the developing world.  (Taylor, 2006, p.939 in Risa, 2009)  These relations were based on 
acceptance of the respective third world regimes, regardless of ideological differences (ibid.), and 
the post-89 development in this sense continued and strengthened trends started with the ascent of 
Deng Xiaoping. China‘s relations with pariah states also deepened in this period, after all, ‗in 
those days it [China] had veered toward pariah status itself.‘ (Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small, 
2008).   Even though the isolation and sanctions ended relatively quickly (Kim, 1994 , p.134), 
they clearly demonstrated that having close relations with third world countries would be 
useful should China be isolated by the West again. At this time, post 1989 and after the 
economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping, the West was the key to continued economic growth, 
whereas developing countries was a source of support in political issues were there was 
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tension between China and the West (Risa, 2009).  
While a change in leadership, i.e. an internal factor, might be considered to be the main 
catalyst spurring the transition between the first two periods (i.e 1949-76, 1978-89) external 
factors clearly played a decisive role in the post-89 development of Chinese policies.  
However, what remains central in both transitional periods, i.e 1976-78 and 1989, was a 
change in what Beijing considered to be of core self-interests.   The shift of overriding 
objectives in foreign policy, from spreading communism to a pragmatic focus on economic 
gain, spurred a change in attitudes towards the principles of sovereignty and non-interference, 
and to foreign policy in general.  These overriding political objectives, I regard as being what 
CCP considered to be in their and China‘s self-interest. Put simply, change in core self-
interests equalled change in foreign policy.  China in this way acts as a rational autonomous 
actor pursuing its own self-interest, increasing its material capabilities and promoting its own 
sovereignty, in line with political realism. (Moseley, Alexander, ―Political Realism‖)  
An interesting example of the highly pragmatic foreign policy can be seen in the Chinese 
response to the Burmese elections in 1990.  Chinese leaders were then among the first to 
congratulate National League for Democracy with the victory, and called on the Burmese 
regime to release its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi who were held in house arrest.
73
  However, 
after it became clear that the junta had no intention of honouring the election results, China 
changed attitude, emphasizing the military‘s role in winning Burma‘s colonial independence 
– implying that this gave the junta legitimacy to hold onto power. 74 Realizing that the 
military junta would still be governing Burma, China decided to side with them, as having 
friendly relations with neighbouring countries, especially at a time when international friends 
where few and far between, was clearly beneficial to China. This pragmatic trend can further 
be observed in the  Chinese response in the build up to the Gulf war of 1990-91.  Despite the 
rather harsh Chinese rhetorics on sovereignty following the Tiananmen crackdown, China 
backed the American led initiative to condemn the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in the UNSC, and 
supported the right to intervene.  The political and economical benefits and a growing 
Chinese awareness that participation in humanitarian operations was central in creating an 
image of China as cooperative and harmless was more important than a rigid defence of the 
principle of non-interference. Building of reputation through actions gained importance 
(Hegseth, 2009, see also Choedon, 2005, Fravel, 1996, Carlson, 2006). China‘s recent emphasis 
on national image and soft power will be discussed in the following sections.   
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2.4 National reputation and soft power 
 
 
National image is particularly important in our globalized world,  
and is already a crucial aspect of national interests.    
Harming national image is harming national interest, and vice versa.  
75
 
 
 
 National image emerged as a hot topic at the international arena especially after Joseph Nye 
coined the term soft power in 1990, and defined it as ‗the ability to get what you want through 
attraction rather than coercion or payments‘.76  Soft power is, in other words, 'the ability to 
through cultural attraction, ideas, policies and political ideals to achieve another party‘s 
respect and affinity, built on the premise that the reputation of a nation is a positive asset that 
can facilitate or impede individual transactions.' (Leonard & Small, 2003). The study of soft 
power and national image is a new and developing phenomenon in China 
77
, and analysing 
national image as a part of international relations is even newer territory (Liu, Yanfang, 
2009). Gill argues that China seeks to develop an image of a responsible, peaceful power 
which doesn‘t seek to challenge the existing system, and, he argues, China needs international 
goodwill to continue her domestic economic and social development (Gill, 2007 p.105).  This 
is crucial in, as the legitimacy of the CCP to a large degree is founded on a successful 
combination of economic and social development. 
78 Gill argues that in order to achieve this, 
a number of criteria needs fulfilment, such as sufficient access to resources, subduing internal 
and regional conflicts, in addition to an international environment which enables China to 
focus on these internal challenges (Ibid, p.132). The correlation between international 
environment and achievement of internal issues is further emphasized by Ni Jianping, deputy 
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director and researcher at the Shanghai American Research Institute. He writes that: ‗Chinese 
foreign policy has in recent years stressed that its present and future essential responsibility 
and fundamental aim is to safeguard the development of China, […]strive for a peaceful and 
stable international environment, a friendly regional environment, equal and  mutually 
beneficial cooperation and an objective, friendly public opinion, to fully serve the 
construction of society where everyone is enjoying a relatively good standard of living‘.79 
The strive for a peaceful, stable and friendly ‗environment‘ hinges to a high degree on having 
a favorable reputation. This is, as pointed out by Ni Jianping, serving the domestic aim of 
creating a society where everyone is well off.  As previously argued, the present legitimacy of 
the CCP rests very much on the promise of delivering economic benefits to its people, in 
other words in creating this kind of society. In this sense it can be argued that having a good 
reputation ultimately serves the aim of holding the CCP in power. Having a good and 
favorable national reputation and image is thus clearly a crucial issue for the CCP.  This 
should of course not be interpreted as Beijing being willing to alter its foreign policy solely 
with the aim of attaining a good international reputation.
80
 Ni Jianping underlines this point, 
arguing that ―Foreign policy must not only serve national interest, it must devote itself to 
creating a good national image; [the issue of creating a good] national image can not be 
separated from the foreign policy of serving national interest, and exist independently. But a 
country‘s foreign policy also can not pursue only national interest and ignore [the issue of 
creating a good] national image.‖ 81 Ni seemingly distinguishes between national interest and 
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Western media and mindsets.  Either the Chinese attempt to counter the damage to its international reputation 
was counterproductive, or the Chinese target was not the international community, but the domestic audience.  
In terms of national reputation, the best thing might have been to release Liu, but there are, of course, other 
factors to a state‘s policies than international image. 
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the construction of a good national image.  I regard these not to be separated, but integrated; 
having a good national image is part of the national interest of China, and for any other 
nation.  The importance of establishing a good national reputation is a hotly debated issue 
among Chinese analysts.  Chinese scholar Bin Ke argues that the focus on China becoming a 
‗responsible‘ power, is rooted in the aspiration the international community holds for China‘s 
new role. ―When it comes to the problems of the democratic process in Burma, the nuclear 
issues in North Korea and Iran, the West demand China to […] promote solutions the 
problems.‖  This is not about China being ‗responsible‘ or not, Bin Ke argues, ―it just reflects 
a desire which the international community holds for China‘s role.‖ 82 The way I understand 
Bin Ke, he is arguing that the international community is trying to unfairly label China 
irresponsible if China does not act a manner the international community finds pleasing.  
Implicitly he is suggesting that the ‗international community‘ (i.e the West) is using the threat 
of a bad reputation as a means to try to persuade China to alter its policies.  This might of 
course hold a certain amount of truth to it, and it fully shows just how important the issue of 
national reputation has become.  The Chinese emphasis on national image can be seen not 
only in Chinese academic circles, but also among Chinese politicians. This following quote is 
taken from a speech by Chinese foreign minister Yang Jiechi the first of December 2010, just 
after a North Korean attack on a South Korean island had seen tensions rise on the Korean 
peninsula. Explaining China‘s stand, Yang Jiechi stated that, ―as a big responsible country, 
China decides its position based on the merits of each case and does not seek to protect any 
side‖.83 It is clearly important for the Foreign Minister to stress that China is a responsible 
country.   
 For a favourable reputation to evolve and be established, China‘s foreign policy must mirror 
this aspiration, as a reputation not based on actions will be merely empty words.  
84
 
In order to do this, China has in recent years strengthened its constructive participation in the 
international community. (Ni, Jianping, 2005) In handling global questions, Beijing has 
emphasized sharing, ‗common honour‘, win-win, and actively contributed goods and 
materials to global and regional areas (ibid). Beijing has also increased the material input to 
international organisations. This is all measures taken to strengthen China‘s soft power (ibid). 
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 Apart from promoting a favourable reputation, countering negative images is a central aspect 
in obtaining a desirable reputation.  Yang Ying points out that, as a positive image creates a 
favourable international environment for China's development, negative representations such 
as the ‗China Threat Theory‘ generates mistrust by other countries, and hampers cooperation. 
(Yang Ying, 2007 p 3). The China threat theory is the idea that the rise of China constitutes a 
threat to peace and stability in Asia and in the world, and the proliferation of this notion was 
obviously not beneficial to the creation of a favourable international image for China.  A 
special issue of the Economist, published in November 1992 and entitled ‗When China 
Wakes‘, together with the American Policy Review article ‗Awakening dragon: The real 
danger in Asia is from China‘, have been regarded as the written origins of the China Threat 
Theory.
85
 China rebuffed the idea as cold-war mentality, and aware of the negative effects 
such an image could cause
86
, Beijing assured its neighbours and the world that its 
development only had peaceful intentions, and in 2003 the notion of China‘s ‗peaceful rise‘, 
和平崛起 heping jueqi, was put forward by the official China.87  Interestingly, the official 
phrase was in 2004 changed into ‗peaceful development‘, as the Chinese 崛起 jueqi, rise, 
bears connotations of a swift rise or a sudden change in an existing situation, which may be 
taken as having a slight abrupt and unwanted touch to it. 
88
  Since then, ‗peaceful 
development‘, 和平发展  heping fazhan has been official Chinese rhetorics. Even though 
heping jueqi is still used quite frequently in the Chinese media, the change of rhetorics serves 
as an indication of just how delicate Beijing considers the issue of image.  
 When the China threat theory was first put forward, it met a receptive audience in the 
Southeast Asian nations, which had historical and territorial conflicts of interests with China 
(Chen, Yue, 2005). China‘s current relations with South East Asian countries, including 
Burma, are now to a large extent dealt with through the Association of South Asian Nations 
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(ASEAN).
89
 ASEAN also plays a major role in Burmese foreign policy, and serves both as a 
larger platform and an alternative for, the Sino-Burmese relationship. ASEAN plays a crucial 
role in Southeast Asian politics, and in order to further contextualize the Sino-Burmese 
relationship, in the next section I will present a brief outline of the relations between and 
China and ASEAN, and ASEAN and Burma.   
 
 
2.5 China - ASEAN - Burma  
 
The relationship between China and South East Asia has undergone significant changes since 
the scepticism two decades ago.   ASEAN‘s concerns over Beijing‘s drive for military 
modernization and its assertive posture in territorial disputes over the South China Sea of the 
early 1990s are now replaced with growing economic ties and shared geo-political interests 
for building regional security through multilateral processes. Since the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis
90
, Beijing has expanded its influence as a major political force in the region and a 
locomotive for economic recovery and future opportunity.
91
  China and ASEAN has today 
‗formed a strategic partnership for peace and prosperity, […] and are cooperating on a range 
of issues of mutual interest from maritime security to non-traditional security 
challenges‘(ibid).  Additionally, the ASEAN - China Free Trade Area (ACFTA) was 
launched January 2010, making it the largest free trade market in the world.  ASEAN 
Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan then said the free trade area will offer further impetus to the 
comprehensive cooperation already taking place between ASEAN and China.  
92
  Presently, 
ACFTA consists of China, and the six earliest members of ASEAN, whereas  Laos, Vietnam, 
Cambodia and Burma are scheduled to join ACFTA in 2015.
93
  
 Burma joined ASEAN in 1997, 30 years after its establishment, and some hold the idea that 
ASEAN‘s  decision to include Burma at least in part was inspired by a desire to limit China‘s 
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growing influence in the country. 
94
 As for the generals in Burma, ASEAN plays an important 
role in rebuffing international pressure, attracting foreign investments, and diversifying 
political allies. A prominent feature of Burmese foreign policy has been the drive to become 
embedded in Southeast Asia‘s regional society, (Haacke, 2006) and relations with ASEAN 
are one of the main pillars of Burma‘s foreign policy.95   China‘s growing influence over 
Burma in the 1990‘s caused anxiety in the ASEAN states, and resulted in Thailand‘s initiative 
- with the support of other ASEAN members - to lobby for Burma to become a full-fledged 
member of ASEAN in 1997. From a Burmese perspective, joining ASEAN moderates 
relations with China, and carries economic benefits.
96
 Jurgen Haacke supplements these 
beneficial aspects of relations with ASEAN, noting that ‗these ties [Burmo-ASEAN] have 
effectively relieved international pressure on the regime and helped to avoid the need to 
compromise its foreign policy ‗(Haacke, 2006,  p41). For a comprehensive understanding of 
Sino-Burmese relations, it is crucial to also examine how the world is perceived from the 
perspective of the Burmese leadership. Let us therefore turn to the politics and foreign policy 
of Burma.  
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3:  The Politics of Burma 
 
Following the adoption of a new constitution in 2008, Burma held general elections the 7
th
 of 
November 2010, the first after the National League for Democracy (NLD) won more than 
80% of the parliamentary seats in the 1990 elections. The military government refused to 
acknowledge the outcome, and have since kept NLD‘s iconic leader Aung San Suu Kyi in 
housearrest for a total of 15 years.
97
 She was released shortly after the   November elections, 
which was characterized with words like ‗farce‘ and ‗mockery‘, and it has been pointed out 
that the elections was designed to further consolidate and legitimize the power of the current 
government.
98
 Election laws and regulations makes it difficult to disagree.
99
 Following the 
elections, official numbers gave the pro-junta party USDP  76% of the parliamentary seats, 
whereas the National Democratic Force (NDF) got 1.3 %, and the democratic opposition 
(including the NDF) got a total of 9%.
100
 The remaining seats were won by parties backed by 
the ruling junta‘s State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) and various ethnic parties.  
Optimists believe that the elections at least will pave way for minor improvements for the 
Burmese population. While the outcome is yet to be seen, it can hardly be argued that the 
Burmese military through the elections seemed to be preparing to give up power.  The 
outcome and aftermath of the elections is not very likely to alter the international 
environment the Burmese junta is operating in. As a Chinese analyst argues; no matter the 
outcome, the West will continue or even strengthen sanctions, whereas China and India will 
continue an ‗engagement policy‘ (接触政策) with Burmese authorities.101  
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 This section will give an outline of some central aspects of Burmese politics. After first 
describing the main political dogmas in Naypidaw, we will look into the domestic backdrop 
upon which this policy is based. The focus will be the ethnic tensions in the border areas and 
we will also touch upon the rather  xenophobic nature of the Burmese rulers.  
 
 The primary task of the Tatmadaw, the Burmese military, is to maintain power. (Yue, 
Deming, 2005)  The military junta officially pursues the so-called ‗Three Main National 
Causes‘, i.e. non-disintegration of the union, non-disintegration of national solidarity and the 
perpetuation of the country‘s sovereignty, in addition to the 12 ‗national objectives‘ in the 
political, economic, and social spheres 
102
( Haacke, p17). Capturing what might be summed 
up as the core of the military‘s domestic political-security imperative, the Three Main 
National Causes highlight the juntas‘ fear of Burma disintegrating. This perceived threat can 
be said to come from two groups, the Burmese democracy movement, and various ethnic 
insurgent groups. Some may include fear of foreign intervention as a third factor.  The regime 
might exaggerate threats to national unity and stability for its own purposes, but as there is no 
clear distinction between security for the state, the regime and the military government, 
significant challenges to state building remain apparent (Haacke, 2006, p.18). To thoroughly 
comprehend the foreign politics of Burma, and its relationship to China, we need to examine 
the motivations of the Burmese leadership, and how these influence the foreign policy. Both 
external factors, such as international isolation, and internal factors, like a highly popular 
democratic opposition and various ethnic insurgency groups, create conditions for a regime 
extremely sensitive to all threats of interference. To better understand the cause of this 
anxiety , it is necessary to examine the domestic situation, and the next part will focus on the 
ethnic diversity of Burma and the conflicts between ethnic minorities and the Burmese 
regime. This part will be followed by an assessment of main priorities in the foreign politics 
of Burma. 
 
3.1 Ethnic conflicts and unstable border-regions 
 
Even if ethnic minorities do not pose an immediate threat to the rule of the SPDC, they 
continue to be a nuisance for the Burmese central government, and ethnic groups along the 
Sino-Burmese borders continue to influence relations between Beijing and Naypitaw.    
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By whatever statistics one relies on, Burma has a genuine ethnic and religious plurality, and  
from a geographical perspective, about one half of the country is comprised of territory 
traditionally occupied by non-Burmese ethnic minorities, most of whom inhabit non-central 
areas. The simplified version of the complex issue of ethnicity in Burma operate with 8 major 
ethnic groups and 135 so-called ‗national‘ or ‗principal races‘, the 8 major groups being the 
Bamar,  Kayin (Karen), Shan, Chin, Rakhine, Mon, Karenni (Kayah) and Kachin. (Matthews, 
2001).
 
 Demographically, the Bamar make up 65% of the nation‘s 50 million population 
(Matthews, 2001). Theoretically, ethnic minorities compromise the remaining 35%, 
103
 
whereas the ethnic Chinese does according to the CIA factbook make up 3% of the Burmese 
population.
104
  Ethnic conflict is not a new phenomenon in Burma, and after independence an 
effort was made to bolster ethnic cooperation. The colonial British rule, it has been argued, 
―stimulated sectional particularism…fostered racial antagonism and subverted the internal 
balance of power‖(Matthews, 2001), and  aware of the difficulties concerning the ethnic 
question the Panglong agreement was signed in 1947. 
105
 However, the assassination of the 
main architect of Burmese independence and the Panglong agreement, Aung San
106
, in July 
1947, just months before Burma‘s independence, compromised the agreement, and his 
successor, Prime Minister U Nu ‗lacked the vision and ability to carry the ethnic accord and 
infant federalism forward ‗ (Matthews, 2001). Ethnic  fragmentation and conflict has been 
used actively by the Burmese central government to legitimize its actions ever since the 
generals of the military coup in 1962, to which the present day regime remains heirs, justified 
its actions as necessary to keep the state from fragmenting into ethnic and political 
secessionist blocs (ibid). The ethnic and religious minorities find themselves frequently 
marginalized, and several groups have taken up arms against the central military regime, the 
most well-known in the West perhaps being the struggle of the Karen (Kayin) people in the 
east of Burma.  Other groups, including the Shan, Arakan, and the Rohinga have also engaged 
in armed struggle against the central government, and it has been a central aspect of SPDC 
policy to to negotiate cease-fire agreements with the various rebel groups (ibid). Matthews 
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emphasises that the cease-fires were accepted by these ethnic organisations in part because 
they were promised a process of economic development and political dialogue. And, as he 
points out, ‗regrettably there is little of the former and none of the latter.‘ 107   The lack of 
economic development and the unstable political situation in the Burmese ethnic frontier 
areas have grave consequences not only for domestic matters.  Instability spreads to the 
Chinese side of the border, and this has serious implications for the relationship between 
China  and Burma. This will be discussed in the next chapter, now let us first finish reviewing 
the politics of Burma, by looking at the colonial experience and its implications for SPDC 
policy.       
 
3.2 Colonial heritage 
 
Apart from the threat coming from ethnic rebel groups, the electoral victory of Aung San Suu 
Kyi‘s party NLD in 1990 and the large scale demonstrations led by monks in September 2007 
were also powerful reminders that the military‘s authority is not based on the loyalty and 
support of the Burmese people, but by the power of their guns. 
108 
In addition to internal 
threats to the military reign, the colonial experience accounts for a strong and pervasive 
nationalism, and the military leaders‘ ―collective hypersensitivity to all perceived threats of 
interference‖ ( Haacke, p 19).  The issue of colonial history is echoed by official Burmese 
sources, explaining that Burmese Foreign Policy is a product of, among other things  ―its 
strong desire to prevent interference in her internal affairs based on her bitter experience with 
colonialism‖.109 The Burmese government consistently broadcasts the message that the 
country will resist what it perceives as ‗attempts to subjugate Myanmar‘ or ‗neo-colonial 
politics‘.  (Haacke, 2006) These factors, coupled with the perceived domestic threats of ethnic 
insurgency and a popular democratic opposition, are creating a fertile soil for the growth of a 
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regime regularly being described as paranoid.
110
 Thaung Tun, Director-General of the 
Political Department of the Burmese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has summed up the core 
objectives in Burma‘s foreign policy like this; 
-To enhance our security  
-To bolster the nation's economic prosperity  
-To promote a peaceful and equitable world order (ibid) 
  
Jürgen Haacke echoes the official Burmese version, though emphasising the dissimilarity of 
the objectives‘ importance, stating that ‗the [Burmese] foreign policy priority is clear. The 
basic security imperative has consistently been regarded as more important than the goals of 
development or improved international standing.‘ (Ibid p.21) The lack of economic 
development, the brutal crackdown of the protests in September 2007, the long-lasting 
detention of Aung San Suu Kyi
111
, and the disregard of international pressure to make the 
coming elections of November 2010 conform to democratic norms, are all strong indicators 
that Haacke's analysis remains valid.     
Eager to guard national sovereignty, the SPDC unsurprisingly shares the Chinese enthusiasm 
for the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence, and the mutual passion for these has served 
as a backbone for Sino-Burmese relations.   
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4:  Sino-Burmese relations  
 
Burma and China are friendly neighbours.   
Since ancient times, the people of the two countries have conducted close contact, as 
brothers. From the establishment of relations 55 years ago, the Sino-Burmese relationship 
has, in the face of changes in the international situation and domestic changes in our 
respective countries, constantly developed (forward).[…] To build good-neighbourly 
friendship between China and Myanmar is an important part of Chinese regional foreign 
policy. 
112
 
President Hu Jintao after meeting the leader of Burma, Senior General Than Shwe in Jakarta, 
April 2005  
 
 
 There are many factors to the Sino-Burmese relationship, as is true for all bilateral relations.  
In this part we will look closer into some of the issues which are defining the relationship 
between China and Burma. Unfortunately, the scope of this thesis does not allow for an 
adequate discussion of all areas affecting relations between Naypitaw and Beijing. This holds 
true perhaps especially for the recent reports that Burma is pursuing acquirement of nuclear 
capability, and its implications for the relationship to China. Besides, a closer look into 
India‘s role as regional power and catalyst for Sino-Burmese relations, together with a 
comparison with Sino-North Korean relations would be valuable for further understanding the 
Sino-Burmese relationship. These topics may be sufficiently examined in additional studies, 
but as for this thesis, there is not enough room for these factors to be dealt with in a 
satisfactory manner. The topics which will be discussed, is Chinese diplomatic support of 
Burma, followed by an examination of the importance of Burma for China‘s future energy 
security. Subsequently  the nature of the economical relations will be illuminated, and finally 
instability in the border areas and its cosequences for the Sino-Burmese relations will be 
investigated.  First, however, we will have a brief introduction to the present day relations.  
 At the same time as Beijing was being isolated by the West after the Tiananmen crackdown, 
Burma found itself in a somewhat similar situation. Following the August 1988 uprising and 
the ensuing violent crackdown which left an estimated 3000 protesters dead, Burma was 
faced with widespread international condemnation as well as economic and diplomatic 
sanctions.  Beijing‘s reaction to the violence in Burma was to ‗strictly pursue a policy based 
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on the Five Principles for Peaceful Co-existence, and not interfere with the internal affairs of 
Burma‘.113 Faced with widespread sanctions, the military leaders of Burma sought stronger 
relations with its neighbours, and relations with China warmed considerably (International 
Crisis Group, 2007). The benefits of the improved relations with China were almost 
immediate for Burma, and China‘s economic, military and political support became a lifeline 
for the military government (ibid). Two substantial arms deals with China in 1990 and 1994, 
worth 1.2billion US$ and 400million US$ respectively, allowed the Tatmadaw (the Burmese 
army)  to replenish and upgrade its armaments (Haacke p.26). Liu Shaohua sums up the 
useful role of China for the Burmese authorities, stating that ‗in safeguarding national 
stability, Burma needs China‘s support […] Moreover, [China‘s support] is beneficial for the 
Burmese to resist the sanctions of Western nations, and to improve the international 
environment.‘114  As a member of the UNSC China holds considerable power on the 
international arena, and combined with its geographical location and its support and aid to 
Burma, China has become Burma‘s most important ally.115  
 For China, Burma is important as a trading outlet for its comparatively poor and landlocked 
inland provinces of Yunnan and Sichuan, as it will be cheaper for products of this region to 
reach either South Asia or Europe via Burma than through the ports of eastern and southern 
China.
116
  Beijing has started to realize the importance of reducing the economical gap 
between the western and eastern provinces, and in order to do this, developing relationship 
with Burma is of crucial importance (Liu, 2001). Because of a rather mismanaged Burmese 
economy and limited bilateral trade, the most important asset Burma offers China is that of 
acting as a transit country.  The Burmese military junta is certainly prepared to let Burma act 
as a junction for goods going to and from China, and has told Beijing to regard Rangoon as 
Yunnans marine port(出海口) (ibid). Oil is a commodity of special significance in this 
regard and we will look further into the  reasons why Burma is of decisive importance to 
China‘s future energy security later in this chapter.  Now China‘s diplomatic support for 
Burma will be the focus of attention, followed by an examination of how incompetence in the 
Burmese leadership is impeding the economical ties between the two nations,and how the 
                                                 
113刘少华，‖论中缅关系‖, 2001  
[Liu, Shaohua, ―Discussing Sino-Burmese Relations‖ , 2001]   
‗对缅甸国内形势的变化[i.e post 1988], 中国政府严格奉行和平共处五项原则, 不干涉缅甸内部事务 
114
ibid, ‗在维护国内稳定方面, 缅甸需要中国的支持[„]  其次, [中国的支持]有利于缅甸抵制西方国
家的制裁, 改善国际环境,’ 
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junta‘s failure to stabilize its northern border is causing problems for China.   
 
4.1 Chinese diplomatic support for Burma 
 
Ever since Beijing following the Burmese elections in 1990 prevented the adoption of the first 
ever UN draft resolution on the human rights situation in Burma in the United Nations General 
Assembly (Haacke, 2006 p.26 ), China has been known as a reliable protector of the military 
junta in Burma.  Recent development shows, however, that Chinese diplomatic backing of the 
Burmese regime has been undergoing adjustments, and does not appear as unreserved as it 
used to.  A resolution in the UNSC demanding the release of political prisoners, expressing 
deep concern at Burma‘s large-scale human rights violations, and calling for the 
establishment of political process leading to a genuine democratic transition
117
 was in January 
2007 vetoed by China. The Chinese ambassador Wang Guangya was arguing that ‗the 
Myanmar issue is mainly the internal affair of a sovereign state‘ and that human rights 
problems were not the purview of the council unless they endangered regional security, which 
the situation in Burma did not.
118
 China, rather unsurprisingly, as we can see, clarifies its 
argument by referring to the concept of sovereignty, underscoring the Chinese emphasis on 
this issue. Despite vetoing the resolution, China called on the Burmese junta to ‗listen to the 
call of its own people […] and speed up the process of dialogues and reforms.‘  (ibid)  
Rather than alienating the Burmese regime, China acted as protectors.  Worth noting is the 
Chinese State Counselor Tang Jiaxuan‘s visit to Burma in February, a month after the session 
in the UNSC. He met with Burmese leader, Senior General Than Shwe, and is said to have 
signalled that ‗China's protection depended on its [Burma‘s] greater willingness to move 
forward with political reforms and take a less confrontational stance with the UN and other 
international institutions‘ (Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small, 2008).  This interpretation of Tang‘s 
visit is not reflected by the Chinese ministry of Foreign Affairs, nor by other checked sources, 
but Ahlbrandt and Smalls understanding becomes somewhat plausible seen in the light of 
moves made by the Burmese leadership just after Tang left Burma late February 2007.  
Burmese leaders then signed a new agreement with the International Labour Organisation 
                                                 
117
For the entire draft resolution, see  
United Nations,  Security Council Draft Resolution, Jan. 12
th
 2007   
118
Wang, Guangya, Security Council Meeting 5619 : The Situation in Myanmar, Jan 12
th
 2007.  
Russia and South Africa also voted against the adoption of the resolution, both referring to Burma not posing a 
threat to regional or international peace.   
Also worth noting, is that three days after China vetoed the Security Council, the Burmese government granted a 
Chinese company a major oil and gas exploration contract, even though it had been outbid by an Indian 
competitor. (Kleine-Albrandt and Small, 2008) 
46 
 
(ILO), which it previously had been threatening to expel from the country.  Albrandt and 
Small regard this to be a result of Chinese diplomatic pressure, which of course should not be 
ruled out, but their paper is not referring to any material backing this assumption. 
119
 Having 
failed to find any statements from either party, or any other substantial information 
supporting this view, the possibility of the two occurrences being coincidental can not be 
ruled out, but the temporal sequence of events does imply a probable connection.  
 China may also have influenced the decision of resuming work with the Burmese 
constitutional national convention, which was announced after Burmese Prime Minister Thein 
Sein‘s trip to Beijing in May 2007.120 The Chinese role in the aftermath of the Burmese 
demonstrations in September later that year remains somewhat more accessible.  As the 
demonstrations gained momentum and reached the headlines of most international media in 
late September and the military junta carried out its threat of using force to stop them, China 
faced international criticism and pressure to toughen its stance on the junta.  Spokesperson 
Jiang Yu of the Chinese foreign ministry then stated, the 27
th
  of September, that China called 
on the respective parties in Burma to exercise restraint and solve the current problem 
properly.  
121
 This was the first time China publicly called for restraint on Burma,
122
 and 
should hence be regarded as a major step by Beijing in its dealings with the Burmese. Chinese 
foreign affairs envoy Tang Jiaxuan later the same month met with Burma‘s foreign minister, 
and demanded the regime to "restore internal stability as soon as possible, properly handle 
issues and actively promote national reconciliation." 
123
 Tang continued, stating that "China 
whole-heartedly hopes that Myanmar will push forward a democracy process that is 
appropriate for the country," an unusual intervention by China (ibid).  
 The Chinese reaction raises questions as for the reason of Beijings shift from the traditional 
position of non-interference in the internal affairs of other nations.  One factor is the Chinese 
hope of stable regional conditions, which could be jeopardized by a violent crackdown and 
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escalation of the conflict in Burma.  Another aspect is the reputational burden of being 
closely associated with the Burmese regime, which has been discussed previously under 
China‘s foreign policies, and I will discuss this in greater detail after finishing the section on 
China‘s response towards Burma in the course and aftermath of the massive demonstrations 
in Burma September 2007.   
 Following the demonstrations, Beijing supported the 2
nd
 of October United Nations Human 
Rights Council (UNHRC) resolution, which was strongly deploring the ‗continued violent 
repression of peaceful demonstrations in Myanmar, including through beatings, killings, arbitrary 
detentions and enforced disappearances, and urging the Government of Myanmar to exercise 
utmost restraint and to desisting from further violence against peaceful protesters.‘ 
124
 The 
resolution was adopted by a no vote consensus by the council, something that may indicate a 
rather passive Chinese acceptance of the resolution. The Chinese representative interestingly 
uses his speaking time at the session to state that ‗China has always respected the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of Myanmar‘. 125 Apart from the fact that the content of this statement 
is rather debatable (both in the Yuan and the Qing dynasty and more recently when PRC was 
supporting the Burmese Communist Party, China quite clearly did not respect the Burmese 
territorial integrity), it seems aimed more at appeasing the Burmese than showing support for 
the resolution.  China did unquestionably support the statement of the UNSC a few days later, 
the 11
th
 of October, which ‗strongly deplores the use of violence against peaceful 
demonstrations in Myanmar‘. 126 Further, it states that ‗The Security Council also calls on the 
Government of Myanmar to take all necessary measures to address the political, economic, 
humanitarian, and human rights issues that are the concern of its people and emphasizes that 
the future of Myanmar lies in the hands of all of its people.‘  127 The Chinese support of this 
statement strongly contrasts to its UNSC veto in January, just 10 months earlier.  The two 
texts are not identical, for instance the point of unconditionally releasing Aung San Suu Kyi 
is not included in the UNSC statement of October the 11
th
. 
128
 However, the UNSC statement 
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48 
 
‗welcomes Human Rights Council resolution S-5/1 of 2 October 2007‘, which „ urges the 
Government of Myanmar to release without delay those arrested and detained as a result of the 
recent repression of peaceful protests, as well as to release all political detainees in Myanmar, 
including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.‘ 129  China thus seemingly supports the release of the detained 
democratic leader, a position that cannot be regarded as strictly non-interference. 
 Though the role of China in these resolutions and statement is somewhat unclear, it remains 
unambiguous that China from January to October 2007 had a clear change of approach to 
Burma.  This does not necessarily imply any concrete changes in Beijing policy towards 
Burma, or any significantly reduced Chinese support of the Burmese leaders, but it is a clear 
change of rhetoric, demonstrating Beijings willingness to criticise the military junta, at least 
at the international stage of the UN. The most plausible explanation for this change of 
approach is the massive media coverage the demonstrations in Burma attracted, and the 
subsequent international criticism of China acting as protectors of the Burmese regime, where 
some even suggested a boycott of the forthcoming Beijing Olympics based on China‘s role in, 
and support for Burma. 
130
 
Nevertheless, China is still Burma‘s most reliable diplomatic supporter, something which can 
be seen in Beijing‘s response to the November 2010 Burmese elections. The elections which 
was widely criticized in the west, was by the Chinese Foreign Ministry described as ‗steady 
and smooth‘ and lacked any hint of criticism.  Why is China still so hesitant of criticizing the 
junta in Naypitaw?  What importance does Burma hold for China? The answer, first and 
foremost, is Burma‘s geographical location.And future Chinese energy security.  
 
4.2 Burma‘s strategic location and future Chinese energy security 
 
We will continue to strengthen cooperation with other nations,  
striving to achieve energy security. 
Liu Jianchao, Spokesperson of The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.  Dec. 2004
131
  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Myanmar neighbours were dropped from the final draft at China‘s urging.(ICG, China‘s Myanmar Dilemma, 
2008) 
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See footnote no. 126. 
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China in 2003 surpassed Japan and became the world‘s second largest consumer of oil, and  
Beijing‘s pursuit of overseas energy resources to feed its fast-growing economy has given rise 
to observations that energy is now the driving force behind Chinese foreign policy. 
132
   
In 1993 China became a net importer of oil, in 2002 China imported 80 million ton , in 2004 
100 million ton, and according to estimates, in 2020 China‘s import needs of oil will have 
increased to 450 million ton.  China‘s reliance on foreign oil will in 2020 perhaps be as high 
as 60%, making China very vulnerable to disruptions in its oil supplies.
133 China‘s reliance on 
foreign oil has made energy security central to the survival of the country, and is therefore an 
important matter on the national strategy agenda. (Tang, 2006)  A rough 75% of Chinese oil 
imports now comes through the Malacca Strait, hence stable and uninterrupted transport of oil 
through the Strait is critical to China‘s economic security. (Zhang, Jie, 2005) The Malacca 
Strait is known as a region where pirate and terrorist activity may occur
134
, and this could 
obviously lead to a severe disruption of supplies (Rüth, 2005). Potentially even a greater 
threat, as pointed out by Dr Jingdong Yuan, is that control of the strait by foreign powers 
would seriously undermine Chinese security interests.
135
 President Hu Jintao in November 
2003 highlighted this fear, suggesting that foreign nations were attempting to control the 
Malacca Strait (Tang, 2006).  Chinese scholar Zhang Jie also points out the danger of the US 
or other nations using the Strait to 'impose restrictions' on China. He further emphasises that 
the Malacca Strait is important not only for China‘s economic security, but also for her 
political and military security.
136
  Securing the Strait, or finding a way to bypass the potential 
danger the Strait poses, would thus be of crucial importance for  Chinese national security.   
 A means of avoiding the potential threat of the Malacca Strait is presently under construction 
in Burma; an oil-pipe from the Burmese coast to the province of Yunnan, will after its 
completion in 2012 provide China with an estimated 20 million ton of crude oil each year,
137
 
enhancing the strategic importance of Burma in Beijing. When news of starting construction 
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of the pipeline was released, China energy net wrote:  ‗The strategic significance of the 
Burmo-Chinese oil-and gas pipe is extremely big‘. 138 Apart from easing the comparably 
impoverished inland provinces of China‘s strained energy supplies, the pipeline will also 
reduce the transportation distance of oil by at least 1200 km. But the most crucial point is that 
by this pipeline, China bypasses the troublesome Malacca Strait.
139
    
 Strategically, Burma is also important for China to establish a presence in the Indian Ocean, 
and to contain India‘s influence in Southeast Asia. China has also been accused of 
establishing military bases on Burmese islands, and these allegations led to the birth of the 
notion that Burma was becoming a Chinese client state.   
 
4.3 Chinese military bases on Burmese soil – Burma, a Chinese client state? 
 
In the 1990's observers started to take the view that Burma was on course to becoming a 
‗client state‘ of China, basing their conclusions partly on reports of China delivering and 
allegedly operating equipment for SIGINT 
140
 activities on various islands off the Burmese 
coast, the most recognized being the Great Coco Island. (Haacke, 2006, p26) The aim of this 
activity was allegedly to gather intelligence on air and naval movements in the north-eastern 
part of the Indian Ocean, and monitor movements in the  Indian Andaman Islands.  (ibid) The 
idea of Burma as China‘s client state was further based on claims of Chinese involvement in 
massive civil and military development projects, including upgrading airstrips and ports, 
believed to potentially serve as operating bases for the Chinese Navy (PLA[N]) and even 
support a future permanent Chinese military presence in Burma (Selth, 2007). 
 There is no doubt that Burma invested in the development of new and existing military 
equipment, the extent of the Chinese involvement however, is unclear.  The Indian 
government has categorically ruled out the existence of Chinese military presence of bases on 
the Coco Island or any other places on Burmese soil, and as Andrew Selth of Griffith Asia 
Institute points out, ‗New Delhi could be lying or confused, but, given its long term strategic 
interests and apparently improved access to the main sites in question, this seems unlikely‘ 
(Selth, 2007). The early reports of Burma becoming a client state for China, thus seems to 
                                                 
138中国能源网 (2009) 中缅油气管道 9 月开建 破解„马六甲困局‟,  
[China Energy net. Construction of the Sino-Burmese oil and gas pipeline starts in September – solving the 
„Malacca Strait difficulty‟, June 2009 ] 
139
 Ibid 
140―SIGINT, (Signal Intelligence) are designed to detect transmissions from broadcast communications systems 
such as radios, as well as radars and other electronic systems. ―, see  
Federation of American Scientist,  SIGINT overview  
51 
 
have been built on false premises.   
Another issue prone to spark notions that Burma is heavily dependent on Beijing has been the 
Burmese economic reliance on its northern neighbour. The military junta has since the 1990‘s 
been seeking to reduce the overwhelming reliance on China, and in terms of economic reliance, 
this policy has proved rather successful.  
 
4.4 Economic relations and Burmese diversification of partners 
 
China is one of Burma‘s most significant trade partners, though the figures seem somewhat 
unreliable.  According to the Burmese Governments own statistics, China in 2008 overtook 
Singapore as principal origin of imports.
141
  As for major Burmese export market, China in 
2007-08 ranked third, totalling just around a fourth of Thailand, and a little less than Burma‘s 
second largest export market, India.  (ibid)   The US state department‘s figures for 2008 are 
somewhat different, ranking China fifth among Burma‘s export markets and second among 
Burma‘s import suppliers.  142 
 
 
Source: Asian Development Bank 
 
In terms of total trade volume, China was in the late 1990‘s surpassed by Thailand as 
Burma‘s main partner.  
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Burmese trade 
 Million US$                                              
 
Source: Asian Development Bank 
 
China‘s economic importance for Burma is certainly significant, it is however far from being 
a total dependence.   
While China is one of Burma‘s main trading partners, Burma holds just a marginal role 
among China‘s economical partners, as can be clearly seen from the diagrams below.  
 
Source: China Stastical Yearbook, 2009 
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Source: China Statistical Yearbook, 2009 
 
 
Even among the 9 ASEAN coutries, Burma only ranks 7th in terms of total trade volume with 
China, and the fact that ASEAN constitutes no more than 7% of total Chinese global trade, 
further helps to put Burma‘s economic significance for China into perspective.  China‘s trade 
with Burma is limited because of the weak Burmese economy (Rüth, 2005 and Arnott, 2004). 
The main reason for this is the economical incompetence in the Burmese leadership, or as put 
by David Arnott,  ―the generals‘ lack of understanding of economics, inadequate banking and 
taxation systems, the absence of the rule of law, military monopolies in key sectors of the 
economy, an unfriendly investment climate, corruption, economic sanctions, and inadequate 
infrastructure‖ (Arnott, 2005 ). A stronger Burmese economy would be beneficial to China, 
as it would generate welfare gains through a bigger bilateral trade volume (Rüth, 2005), and 
this would be especially valuable for the relatively poor Yunnan-Province (ibid).  The 
Chinese would thus reap benefits of a more competent Burmese leadership and a more 
prosperous Burma,and for several years China has encouraged the Burmese military leaders 
to undertake economic reforms (Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Small, 2008). It is also worth 
mentioning that Beijing for a long time supported former Burmese Prime Minister Khin 
Nyunt,whom it regarded as a Deng-style reformist,
143
 but in 2004 he was charged with 
corruption and insubordination and placed under house arrest; a verdict widely regarded as a 
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political decision undertaken by the hardliners within the Burmese leadership.
144
 Chinese 
confidence in the Burmese regime‘s willingness and ability to reform faded following this 
incident. (Kleine-Ahlbrandt & Small, 2008) 
 Regardless of Chinese dissatisfaction of the economical management of Burma, China 
undoubtedly remains a major trade partner for the Burmese, and holds an important role in 
Burmese economics. The close ties between China and Burma, economically as well as 
strategically, have, however, presented the Burmese authorities with a dilemma: How can 
Burma avoid getting too dependent on Beijing, maintain its independence and strategic 
neutrality, while still preserving good relations with its neighbouring countries, including 
China?   Diversification of partners seems to be the preferable measure.   After China became 
Burma‘s prime supporter and partner in 1988, and provided the nation with large quantities of 
goods, including weapons
145
, Burma quickly diversified its sources of weapons procurement, 
as illustrated by the purchase from Russia of helicopter gunships in 1995 (Haacke, 2006 p 
27), and 12 MiG-29 fighters in 2001, whereupon Burma also sent 300 military personnel to 
Moscow for pilot-training, and to acquire rocket technology. 
146
    
 The strategic significance of this, as the same report points out, is clearly that Russia offers 
Burma a potential alternative to balance China and India.  Russia‘s diplomatic support for the 
Burmese generals in international fora such as the UNSC
147
 proves the significance of this 
relationship, and also underlines the fact that Burma is not reliant on China alone for 
diplomatic protection.  Furthermore, the strategic location between China and India, two 
nations competing for influence in the region, is actively used by the junta, playing the two 
neighbours up against each other in order to to prevent either one from gaining an excessive 
hold over its economy, policy and society (Rüth, 2005). In the late 80‘s and in the beginning 
of the 90‘s, India openly supported the democratic movement in Burma, but this changed in 
the mid-90, when India, in order to enhance its influence in Southeast Asia and to curb the 
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growing influence of China in the same region, initiated its ‗look east strategy‘.148  India now 
started to develop relations with the Burmese junta, a move which was warmly welcomed by 
the Burmese generals, who themselves were starting to get concerned over growing Chinese 
influence in Burma. (As we read in the part on Burmo-ASEAN relations, it was just in this 
period the Burmese junta started to work towards a ASEAN membership, further reducing 
their dependence on China). 
 Let us now leave the realm of international politics and diplomacy, and take a closer look 
into the instability in the Burma-China border areas, and its consequences for the relationship 
between the two neighbours.   
 
4.5 Ethnic tension and border problems 
 
The border between China and Burma is a frontier between the most ethnically diverse 
regions of the two countries, on one side Yunnan on the Burmese side the Shan and the 
Kachin State.
149
 The areas on the Burmese side of the Sino-Burmese border remain volatile, 
and the central government‘s control over the area is sometimes disputed. This carries 
substantial consequences for local administrative organization and governance,
150
 and 
accordingly for the Sino-Burmese relationship.  
 When the remains of the Communist Party of Burma was dissolved in the late 1980‘s, many 
elements within the Communist forces entered the ranks of the then newly established United 
Wa State Army.  The Wa formed the biggest ethnic group within the CPB
151
, and now 
continued the struggle against the central Burmese government under a new banner.  The 
United Wa State Army presently holds the biggest non-state army in Burma, believed to 
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consist of approximately 20 000 men. It has been claimed that the Wa-region today is an 
‗independent state and has much closer links with China than with the rest of Myanmar.‘ 
(Haacke, 2006, p. 28)  This situation has proved challenging not only to the Burmese 
government. As the situation stands today, Burma's lawless borders permit all sorts of poisons 
- not just insurgency, but drugs and AIDS - to enter China. The trade in opium and heroin into 
China, which is partly fostered by some of Burma's ruling generals and partly conducted by 
the rebel armies the junta has failed to suppress after decades of fighting, brought drug 
addiction into China's southern provinces, where ethnic minorities are clustered. Shared 
needles from that plague produced China's first HIV epidemic.
152
  
 Prostitution and gambling are other cross-border problems affecting China.  After Chinese 
officials started to gamble heavily and pawned official vehicles, China in July 2005 sent a 
military police unit to retrieve the official vehicles that had been seized as security.  The 
failure of the Burmese government to react to this violation of Burmese sovereignty has been 
regarded as an indication of Chinese influence.
153
 It could, however, simultaneously be 
regarded as an expression of Burmese fear of provoking further Chinese reactions.    
 Kokang is another area in northern Burma, with similar characteristics as those of the the Wa 
State. The people of Kokang are largely ethnic Chinese, using Chinese yuan in business, 
speaking Chinese, and has established what has been described as ‗a country within a 
country‘.  154  As with the Wa State, Kokang presents China with a somewhat unstable border 
frontier.   August 2009, following clashes between Kokang forces and their allies in the 
UWSA, and Burmese troops, left 37 000 people fleeing Burma to seek refuge in China.
155
  
Being preoccupied by stability in its region, this is obviously not a desirable situation for 
Beijing.  The Burmese decision to enter Kokang territory despite Chinese concern was seen 
by some observers as a way of demonstrating that they will not be constrained by Beijing. 
(Ibid)  The Chinese reacted by making a rare comment on the internal affairs of Burma, 
stating that the government in Beijing ‗hopes that Myanmar can properly deal with its 
domestic issue to safeguard the regional stability of its bordering area.‘ 156  
 Being the most unstable border region in China, the Burmese border poses a challenge to the 
Chinese policy of promoting and ensuring a peaceful and stable regional environment.  The 
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conflict in Northern Burma has been described as ―the longest-running armed conflict in the 
world‖ and has continued, in one form or another, from independence [1948] to the present 
day 
157
  
 Along with the burden of being ‗dragged through the mud every time Burma‘s rulers 
commits a new outrage‘, the failure of the current Burmese government to stabilize its 
northern border, are, in the words of Burmese analyst Aung Zaw ‗becoming a major headache 
for Beijing‘.158 This might, for a pragmatic Beijing seeking regional stability and an 
international recognition as a responsible power, spur a subtle shift in its support of the 
Burmese junta.  Wen Liao, an analyst in Foreign Policy Magazine argues that Beijing may be 
looking to re-evaluate its backing of the SPDC.  ‗It's not that China is concerned that such a 
government is morally suspect; it's that Beijing worries that Burma's leaders are 
incompetent.‘159  
 China may have little interest in promoting a democratization of Burma, and a democratic, 
western-leaning Burmese government is not in the interest of Beijing. However, to bolster 
relations with the Burmese democratic opposition, Beijing has expanded its network of 
contacts within the exiled dissident community, and Chinese officials based in Yunnan have 
with increasing frequency been meeting with Burmese exiled groups in Thailand. 
160
 The 
Chinese has also allowed conferences and seminars on Burmese issues to take place in China, 
a move which was seen as remarkable.  
161
  International Crisis group reports the same 
increased contact between Burmese democratic opposition and Chinese officials, dating the 
ousting of Khin Nyunt in October 2004 as a catalyst for the escalating contacts. (International 
Crisis Group, 2009)
 
 This should however not be seen as Chinese support for the Burmese 
opposition, but more of a pragmatic realization that if the day comes when democratic forces 
will hold power in Burma, it will be of major importance to be on friendly terms and prevent 
Burma from seeking too close relations with western countries and the US in particular.   
Burmese opposition likewise knows that China could be a crucial partner and a potentially 
positive influence, and  the NLD has several times sent letters to the Chinese embassy in 
Rangoon, expressing desire to build a ‗fraternal relationship‘ with China and asked for 
Beijing‘s support in Burma‘s national reconciliation process.162 
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Conclusion 
 
 
Being neighbouring countries, Burma and China have a long history of close relations.   
Always being the bigger and stronger power, the Chinese have to a considerable degree been 
regarded with a sceptic Burmese eye, since Narathipahapati fled the Yuan army, to present 
day leaders seeking to minimize their dependence on their northern neighbour.    
 The Burmese leaders, many of whom have spent their military career fighting Chinese-
backed groups, both in the Burmese communist party and various ethnic rebel groups, 
continue to stress the Five Principles of peaceful co-existence, emphasizing non-interference 
and sovereignty.  This suggests that the leaders are interested in good working relations with 
China, though suspicious of Chinese long-term strategic intentions, and well aware of the 
dangers in relying too heavily on China.  To diversify its sources of diplomatic support, the 
Burmese regime has focused on developing bilateral relations with India, Thailand, other 
ASEAN countries and Russia. Fears about possible future Chinese economic domination also 
seem to have spurred Yangon to enhance economic ties with the ASEAN states. (Haacke, 
2006 p.28)   
 China has historically regarded Burma as one of her vassals, and through the Mao-era, 
Beijing was pursuing a highly interfering policy in relation to Burma by supporting the armed 
revolt of the BPC.  Since Deng Xiaoping took power, China‘s policy towards Burma has been 
in line with the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence and its general policy of ensuring a 
stable external environment with the neighbouring states so that Beijing can continue to 
implement its domestic modernization and development policy.  
 However, since the ascent of China as a global power, and the recent Chinese focus on 
international image and soft power, its support for the world‘s pariah states has become a 
reputational burden, and seems to have undergone adjustment. Coupled with a growing 
frustration over Burma‘s incompetence in stabilizing its northern border and creating 
economical growth, and Beijing‘s realization that a prosperous Burma would also benefit 
China, Beijing is slowly altering its stance and unconditional support for the Burmese 
junta.
163
 Recent Chinese statements in the UN reinforce this trend, for instance when China in 
2007 for the first time criticized the Burmese military leaders.  This trend of not siding 
categorically with pariah states can be seen in Chinese reactions to conflicts in other nations 
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as well, notably Sudan in 2007 and in 2006, when China criticized Iran for their lack of 
cooperation with the international community in regard to their nuclear program.
164
 This can 
be regarded as a way of improving China‘s international reputation, as China seeks to 
establish an image of themselves as a responsible big power, but perhaps more accurately, the 
new Chinese emphasis on international reputation can be understood as a continuation of the 
pragmatism which has characterized Chinese politics since 1978; as the notion that a 
favourable international reputation serves Chinese interests gains foothold in Beijing, Chinese 
foreign policy has to a larger extent taken the perspective of image into consideration when 
implementing Chinese policy.  Other factors should of course be examined as well; following 
the rise of China, Beijing‘s potential ability to influence other countries increases, and the 
tenants of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-operation may not serve China‘s interests as 
well as they have in the last 30 years.       
Burma holds importance for China first and foremost as a transit country, as an outlet to the 
Indian Ocean, highlighted by the construction of the oil pipe. Beijing has vast interests in the 
country, and preserving friendly relations with Burma remains a central aspect of China‘s 
regional policy.
165
  China most probably remains the nation with greatest power and influence 
over the Burmese leadership but the notions that Burma is becoming a Chinese vassal state, 
or that Burma is merely a pawn in Chinese international politics, seem highly exaggerated. 
This is both because of Burmese caution and fear of excessive reliance on China, and because 
China seemingly does not attach too much diplomatic importance to Burma, having 
comparably few diplomats in the country.
166
  
 China does not want a Western leaning state on its border,  but neither does it want the 
world‘s pariah. It does not seem very likely that Beijing at this stage will dramatically change 
its policies towards Burma, like it did in the 1980‘s when it stopped supporting the Burmese 
Communist Party.  What seems more likely is that Beijing will subtly be altering its policies 
towards Burma, which in turn might weaken the alliance that has been the Burmese junta‘s 
main support for the last 20 years. 
                                                 
164
 Kleine-Ahlbrandt and Andrew Small, ―China's New Dictatorship Diplomacy‖ -  
―China in July 2006 supported UN Security Council Resolution 1696, which demanded the suspension of 
Iranian enrichment activities and threatened sanctions in case of noncompliance.‖ 
165
 朱振明，”中国的睦邻外交与中缅关系”，东南亚南亚研究，2009 年第 2 期 
[Zhu, Zhenming, ―China‘s good-neighbour policy and Sino-Burmese relations‖, Southeast and South Asian 
Studies, no.2, 2009 
166
 Within the Chinese foreign ministry, more diplomats are assigned to Thailand and Indonesia, for example, 
than Myanmar. Most Chinese experts on Myanmar are located in Yunnan. Myanmar‘s low priority as a foreign 
policy issue, particularly at the Beijing level – was an opinion expressed by most diplomats interviewed.  
-No think tank in Beijing has a full-time researcher dedicated to Myanmar; rather the country is covered under 
the umbrella of South East Asia and ASEAN. (ICG,  ―China‘s Myanmar dilemma‖)     
60 
 
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY: 
 
 
About ASEAN – Overview, ASEAN 
http://www.aseansec.org/about_ASEAN.html 
 
 
Al-Jazeera, US condemns Myanmar poll „mockery‟, March 11th 2010 
http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia-pacific/2010/03/201031133928575295.html  
[13.01.11] 
 
 
Ammon, Ulrich (ed.)  2006,  Sociolinguistics: An international handbook of the science of 
language and society,  Vol 3, de Gruyter, Berlin 
 
 
Arnott,  David, 2001,  ―China-Burma relations‖, Chapter 3 in Challenges to Democratization 
in Burma – Perspectives on multilateral and bilateral responses, International Institute for 
Democracy and Electoral Assistance (International IDEA), 2001, Available at 
http://burmalibrary.org/docs3/BURMA_beyond_2000_chap3-China.pdf [15.01.11] 
 
 
Arnott, David,  A prosperous Burma would benefit China, The Irrawaddy, July 2005 
Volume12 No.7 http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=3798&page=2 [13.01.11] 
 
 
Aung, Winston Set, ―The role of Informal Cross-border trade in Myanmar‖, Asia Paper Sept. 
2009, Institute for Security and Development Policy, Stockholm,   
 
 
Aung Zaw, The Spring before Khin Nyunt‟s Fall, The Irrawaddy, Oct. 2008 
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=14354&page=1  [13.01.11] 
 
 
Aung Zaw, China‟s troublesome little brother, The Irrawaddy, Sept. 2009 
http://www.irrawaddy.org/print_article.php?art_id=16675 [13.01.11] 
 
 
Batabyal, Anindya, ―Balancing China in Asia: A Realist Assessment of India‘s Look East 
Strategy‖, China report 42:2, 2006, Sage Publications, 
 
 
BBC, Explaining India‟s silence over Burma, Sept 26th 2007 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7013975.stm [13.01.11] 
 
 
Beech, Hannah, What's Next for Burma Opposition After Elections?, Time Magazine Nov. 8
th
 
2010 http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2030025,00.html#ixzz162VXyLHH 
[13.01.11]    
61 
 
 
 
Beukel, Erik ―China and the South China Sea: Two faces of Power in the Rising China‘s 
Neighbourhood Policy‖, DIIS Working Paper no 7 2010, Danish Institute for International 
Studies (DIIS),  Copenhagen 2010 
 
 
宾科, ‖‘中国责任论‘与缅甸民主进程中的‘中国角色‖, 湘潮 ,2008 年 09 期 
[Bin Ke, ―‘Responsible China‘ and the ‘Chinese role‘ in Burma‘s democratic process‖, 
Xiangchao no.9 2008] 
 
 
Beukel, Erik, ―China and the South China Sea: Two faces of Power in the Rising China‘s 
Neighbourhood Policy‖, Diis Working Paper 2010:07, Danish Institute for International 
Studies, Copenhagen 2010   
 
 
Boot, William, China hedges its Energy bet with move into Bangladesh, The Irrawaddy Sept. 
2
nd
 2009  http://www.irrawaddy.org/highlight.php?art_id=16706  [13.01.11] 
 
 
Bo Kyaw Nyein, Thinking outside the box, Mizzima, June 21
st
 , 2009 
http://www.mizzima.com/archive/2337-thinking-outside-the-box-.html  
[13.01.11] 
 
 
Boucaud, André and Louis Boucaud, Burma – a 24th province for China, Le Monde 
Diplomatique, Nov. 2006
  
http://mondediplo.com/2006/11/07burma [13.01.11] 
 
 
Bristow,  Michael, China‟s dilemma over Darfur, BBC News, Feb.13th 2008  
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7242725.stm [13.01.11] 
 
 
Brown, Kerry Paranoid, insular and inept, the junta has no plan B, The Guardian, Sept 27
th
 
2007 http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/sep/28/comment.burma 
 
 
Buncombe, Andrew ‗Paranoid Burmese junta step up security around Aung San Suu Kyi, The 
Independent, May 16
th
  2008 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/paranoid-burmese-junta-steps-up-security-
around-suu-kyi-829322.html [14.01.11] 
 
 
Butwell, Richard, 1963, U Nu of Burma, Stanford University Press, Stanford;California 
 
 
Callahan, William A. 2010, China: The pessoptimist nation, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford;New York 
 
62 
 
 
Carlson, Allen, 2006, ―More Than Just Saying No: China's Evolving Approach to 
Sovereignty and Intervention‖. In A. I. Johston, & R. S. Ross (eds.), New Directions in the 
Study of China's Foreign Policy (pp. 217-241) Stanford University Press, Stanford; 
California: 
 
 
CCTV, 就能源安全与能源合作等问题答问, 2004 年 12 月 16 日 
[Questions and answers concerning security and energy cooperation, Dec. 16
th
 2004 
http://www.cctv.com/news/special/C14249/20050627/101942.shtml  
[13.01.11] 
 
 
Center of Public Diplomacy, What is Public Diplomacy?, University of Southern California, 
http://uscpublicdiplomacy.com/index.php/about/what_is_pd [13.01.11] 
 
 
Chao-Tzang Yawnghwe ,‖Burma and National Reconciliation: Ethnic Conflict and State-
Society Dysfunction‖, Legal Issues on Burma Journal, No.10 Dec 2001 
 
 
Chatham House (2007) The principle of Non-Intervention in Contemporary International 
Law: Non-interference in a state‟s internal affairs used to be a rule of international law: is it 
still?‘, Extract from a Chatham House International Law discussion group, Feb. 28th  2007.   
www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/6567_il280207.pdf [15.01.11] 
 
 
陈岳, ‖中国威胁论与中国和平崛起 ---一种‘层次分析‘法的解读‖, 外交评论 2005 年 6 月
总第 82 期， 中国人民大学国际关系学院 
[Chen Yue, ‖The China threat theory and the Peaceful rise of China – A systematic analysis‖] 
Foreign Affairs Review, June 2005  
 
 
程瑞声，‖从中缅关系看五项原则的强大生命力‖ ,亚非纵横 2004 年第四期 
[Cheng, Ruisheng, ‖Looking at the great vitality of the five principles (of peaceful co-
existence) from the angle of Sino-Burmese relations‖, Afro-Asian review, Vol 4. 2004 ]    
 
 
中国能源网,  中缅油气管道 9 月开建 破解„马六甲困局‟,  
[China Energy Net. Construction of the Sino-Burmese oil and gas pipeline starts in 
September – solving the „Malacca Strait difficulty‟, June 2009 ]  
http://www.china5e.com/show.php?contentid=28070 [13.01.11] 
 
 
 
中国网 , 中缅两国通过置换领土和平解决边界争端, 2009 年 8 月 28 日 
 [China Net (2009) China and Burma solved the border dispute peacefully, by exchanging 
territory, Aug. 28
th
 2009]  http://www.china.com.cn/news/60years/2009-
08/28/content_18422602.htm [13.01.11] 
63 
 
 
 
 
中国网， 中方吁缅甸有关各方保持克制尽快恢复稳定 ，2007 年 9 月 27 日 
China net, China urges all sides in Burma to exercise restraint and restore stability as soon 
as possible, Sept 27th 2007 
http://www.china.com.cn/international/txt/2007-09/27/content_8963293.htm [13.01.11] 
 
 
中国新闻网，美国新战略呈现 4新特点  对中国期待有所变化, 2010年 6月 7日 
[Chinanews, 4 New characteristics of the new American national security strategy. Slight 
changes in the  expectations towards China. June 7
th
 2010 
http://www.chinanews.com.cn/gj/gj-lwxwzk/news/2010/06-07/2327842.shtml  
[13.01.11] 
 
 
China Statistical Yearbook, 2009 
http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/ndsj/2009/indexeh.htm [03.12.10] 
 
 
CIA report, Peking and the Burmese communists: The perils and profits of insurgency, RSS 
NO. 0052171 July 1971. Approved for release May 2007 
http://www.foia.cia.gov/CPE/ESAU/esau-52.pdf   [03.12.10] 
 
 
CIA-The World Factbook : Burma 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html [13.01.11] 
 
 
Columbia Electronic Encyclopedia (The), Sovereignty 
http://education.yahoo.com/reference/encyclopedia/entry/sovereig  [13.01.11] 
 
 
Dai, Yingcong, ―A Disguised Defeat: The Myanmar Campaign of the Qing Dynasty‖, 
Modern Asia Studies Vol 38, No 1 2004 
 
 
Democratic Voice of Burma, China tired of Burma‟s foot-dragging, Dec.10th 2010 
http://www.dvb.no/news/china-tired-of-burmas-foot-dragging/13334 [23.01.11] 
 
 
Democratic Voice of Burma, Final election results announced, Nov. 18
th
 2010 
http://www.dvb.no/elections/final-election-results-announced/12942   [13.01.11] 
 
 
Den Norske Burmakomité, -Militæret vil stå for eget fall i Burma, Feb. 18th  2010 
http://www.burma.no/Artikler/4152.html [13.01.11] 
 
 
Den Norske Burmakomité, Aung San Suu Kyi i korthet,  Nov. 12th 2010 
http://www.burma.no/Artikler/4523.html [20.01.11] 
64 
 
 
 
Enabulele,  A.O. and C.O. Imoedemhe, ―Unification of the Application of International Law 
in the Municipal Realm: A Challenge for Contemporary International Law ― Electronic 
Journal of Comparative Law, December 2008  
http://www.ejcl.org/123/art123-1.doc [03.12.10] 
 
 
Fairbank, John King, 1968,  The Chinese World Order, Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge;Massachusets  
 
 
范宏伟, “缅甸华文教育的现状与前景”, 东南亚研究 2006年第6期 
[Fan, Hongwei, ―The present and future of Chinese-language education in Burma‖, Southeast 
Asian Affairs, no.6 2006] 
 
 
范宏伟,  ―从外交部解密档案看中缅关系中的华侨问题”,南洋问题研究,2007年第 1期  
[Fan, Hongwei, ―Assessing the question of overseas Chinese in Sino-Burmese relations 
through deciphering documents of the Foreign Ministry‖, Southeast Asian Affairs, no.1 2007]  
 
 
范宏伟,  ―从外交部解密档案看建交初期(1949-1953)的中缅关系”, 云南社会科学 2008 
年第 2 期 
[Fan, Hongwei, ―Assessing the early Sino-Burmese relations (1049-1953) through 
deciphering documents of the Foreign Ministry‖, Social science in Yunnan, Vol 2. 2008.] 
 
 
Fan Hongwei, ―Sino-Burmese relations 1949-1953: Suspicions and Equivocations‖, ICS 
Working Papers no. 19 2008 
 
 
方积根 胡文英, ―缅甸华文报刊历史略‖, 东南亚华人 1988 no.1 
[Fang Jigen & Hu Wenying, ―A brief history of Chinese-language publications in Burma‖, 
The Chinese in Southeast Asia, no.1 1988] 
 
 
Federation of American Scientist,  SIGINT overview 
http://www.fas.org/spp/military/program/sigint/overview.htm 
 
 
Fuller, Thomas, Fleeing Battle, Myanmar Refugees Head to China, New York Times, Aug 
28
th
 2009 http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/29/world/asia/29myanmar.html?_r=1&ref=world 
[13.01.11] 
 
 
Gill, Bates, 2007, Rising star- China‟s new security diplomacy, Brooking institution press, 
Washington 
 
 
65 
 
Gill, Bates,  ―China as a responsible stakeholder‖, Carnegie Endowment, June 11th  2007 
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/events/index.cfm?fa=eventDetail&id=998  
[13.01.11] 
 
 
Gill, Bates, ―China becoming a responsible stakeholder‖, Carnegie Endowment 
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/Bates_paper.pdf   [13.01.11] 
 
 
 
Glaser, Bonnie S and Evan S Medeiros, ―The Changing Ecology of Foreign Policy-Making in 
China: The Ascension and Demise of the Theory of  ‗Peaceful Rise‘‖ The China Quarterly, 
vol 190, June 2007, p.291-310 
 
 
环球时报, 社评：周边国家应支持缅甸稳定,2010年 11月 9 日 
[Global Times, Editorial:Neighbouring countries should support stability in Burma, Nov. 9
th
  
2010] 
http://opinion.huanqiu.com/roll/2010-11/1237733.html  [13.01.11] 
 
 
 
环球时报，安理会通过对伊郎制裁决议  中国投赞成票 ，2010 年 6月 9日 
[Global Times, The Security Council passes resolution imposing sanctions on Iran.  China 
supported the resolution, June 9
th
 2010] http://world.huanqiu.com/roll/2010-06/849894.html 
[13.01.11] 
 
 
Goh Geok Yian, ―The question of ‗China‘ in Burmese chronicles‖,  Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies, 41(1), pp 125–152，Feb 2010. 
 
 
 
Haacke, Jürgen, 2006, Myanmar‟s foreign policy: Domestic Influences and international 
implications, The International Institute for Strategic Studies - Adelphi Paper 381, Routledge, 
New York 
 
Haacke, Jürgen, ―China‘s role in the pursuit of security by Myanmar‘s State Peace and 
Development Council: boon and bane?‖ The Pacific Review, Vol. 23 No. 1 March 2010: 113–
137 
 
Hong Lei,  Foreign Ministry Spokeperson Hong Lei‟s regular press conference, Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the People‘s Republic of China, Nov 9th  2010 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/xwfw/s2510/t768001.htm [13.01.11] 
 
 
Htin Aung, 1967, A history of Burma, Columbia University Press, New York and London 
(Also named Maung Htin Aung) 
 
 
66 
 
Htun Aung Gyaw, The Ethnic Issue in Burma: How can they solve it, 
http://www.burmalibrary.org/reg.burma/archives/199812/msg00304.html 
[03.12.10] 
 
 
何新华, ‖ 试析清代缅甸的藩属国地位问题‖，历史档案 2006 年 1 期 
[He, Xinhua, ‖Analyzing Burma‘s position as vassal state during the Qing Dynasty‖, 
Historical Archives vol 1. 2006]   
 
 
Hegseth, Kari Nøst, Kina i Afrika: Implikasjoner for Kinas tilnærming til ikke-innblanding og 
suverenitet, Master thesis, University of Oslo, 2009 
 
 
International Crisis Group publication (ICG), ―China‘s Myanmar Dilemma‖, Asia Report No 
177, Sept. 2009 
 
 
Irrawaddy (The),  Junta hands Khin Nyunt 44 year Suspended jail term, July 2005 
http://www.irrawaddymedia.com/article.php?art_id=4836&Submit=Submit   [13.01.11] 
 
Johnstone, William C. 1963, Burma‟s Foreign Policy: A Study in Neutralism, Harvard 
University Press, Cambridge;Massachusets 
 
 
Kim, Samuel S. 1993, Sovereignty in the Chinese Image of World Order , in Essays in Honor 
of Wang Tieya, 1993 ed. by John Macdonald, p.425—445, Martinius Nijhoff Publishers, 
Dordrecht 
 
 
Kim, Samuel. S. 1994, ―China and the Third World in the Changing World Order‖, in China 
and the World: Chinese Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era ed by Samuel. S. Kim  
p. 128-170. Westview Press, Boulder,Colorado 
 
 
Kleine-Ahlbrandt, Stephanie and Andrew Small, ―China's New Dictatorship Diplomacy:  Is 
Beijing Parting With Pariahs?‖, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2008 
 
 
Kudo,  Toshiro ―Myanmar‘s Economic Relations with China: Can China support the 
Myanmar Economy‖, IDE Discussion Paper. No. 66. 2006, Institute of Developing 
Economies(IDE)  
 
 
Laichen Sun,  Suzerain and Vassal, or Elder and Younger Brothers: The Nature of the Sino-
Burmese Historical Relationship, Abstract of paper delivered at the annual meeting of the 
Assocation of Asian Studies, 1997  
http://www.asian-studies.org/absts/1997abst/seasia/sea43.htm  
[13.01.11] 
 
67 
 
 
La Bail,  Helene &  Abel Tournier, ―From Kunming to Mandalay: The New ‗Burma Road‘ – 
Developments along the Sino-Myanmar border since 1988‖,  Asie Visions 25, March 2010 
Institut francais des relations internationales 
 
 
Leonard , Mark and Andrew Small, ―Norway‘s public diplomacy: A strategy‖, June 2003 
http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/public.pdf [17.01.11] 
 
 
Li, Jinjun, Speech of Ambassador Li Jinjun on the Reception of Celebrating the 55th 
Anniversary of the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations between China and Myanmar, 
Embassy of the People‘s Republic of China in the Union in Myanmar, June 9th 2005 
http://mm.china-embassy.org/eng/xwdt/t199231.htm [19.01.11] 
 
 
Li, Xingeng, ―Sino-Myanmar Relations: Analysis and Prospects‖,  The Culture Mandala, 
Vol. 7 no. 2, Dec. 2006  
http://www.international-relations.com/CM7-2WB/Sino-Myanmar.htm 
[10.01.11] 
 
Linklater, Andrew (ed. ) 2000, International Relations – Critical concepts in Political Science 
vol IV, Routledge, London  
 
 
Lintner, Bertil, 1990, The rise and fall of the communist party of Burma (CPB), Southeast 
Asia Program Cornell University, Ithaca; New York 
 
 
Lintner, Bertil, 1992 ―Burma and its Neigbours‖,  Paper presented at a conference in February 
1992 at the Nehru Memorial Museum and Library, New Delhi. Also published in Surjit 
Mansingh (ed.), Indian and Chinese Foreign Policies in Comparative Perspective (New 
Delhi: Radiant Publishers, 1998) 
 
 
林锡星，”缅甸历史分期探析”，东南亚研究，2002 年第 5 期 
[Lin, Xixing, ―An analysis of the period classification of Burmese history‖, Southeast Asia 
Studies, vol 5. 2002] 
 
 
刘斌,  解密缅甸„国中之国‘, 南方周末, 2009 年 9 月 9 日  
[Liu, Bin, Unraveling the secrets of Burma‟s ‟country within the country‟, Southern Weekly, 
Sept. 9
th
 2009]  http://www.infzm.com/content/34450 [13.01.11] 
 
 
刘少华，‖论中缅关系”，武汉大学学报，第3 期2001年5月, 
[Liu, Shaohua, ―Discussing Sino-Burmese Relations‖, Wuhan University Journal, Vol 3. May 
2001] 
 
 
68 
 
刘务，‖缅甸独立后外交政策的演变与中缅关系的发展‖, 当代亚太，2010 年 01 期 
[Liu, Wu, ―Changes in the policies of post-independent Burma and the development of Sino-
Burmese relations‖, Journal of contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies No 1. 2010: p109-118] 
 
 
刘晓民与范宏伟, ―战后缅甸华侨国籍个案研究‖，东南亚研究，2005 年 6 期) 
[Liu, Xiaomin & Fan Hongwei, ―A case study of Burmese-Chineses‘ nationality after World 
War II‖, Southeast Asian Affairs, no.6 2005] 
 
 
刘艳房,  ―国家形象战略研究‖, 中国特色社会主义研究,  2009 年第 1 期  
[Liu, Yanfang, ―Research on national image strategy, Studies on Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics, vol 1. 2009]    
 
 
Martin, Michael F. ―Burmas elections 2010: Implications of the new constitution and election 
laws‖, Congressional Research Service, April 2010 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R41218.pdf 
 
 
Mason, Margie, Philippines calls Burma elections „farce‟, The Irrawaddy, Oct. 27th 2010 
www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=19835 [13.01.11] 
 
 
Matthews, Bruce, ―Ethnic and Religious Diversity: Myanmars unfolding Nemesis‖, Visiting 
Researchers Series no.3 2001, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore 
 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People‘s Republic of China,   
胡锦涛会见缅甸和平与发展委员会主席丹瑞, 
[Hu Jintao meets Chairman of Myanmar‟s State Peace and Development Council, Than 
Shwe,  April 23rd, 2005] 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/pds/gjhdq/gj/yz/1206_23/xgxw/t192914.htm [13.01.11] 
 
 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People‘s Republic of China,  中国外交政策 
[Chinese foreign policy]  
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/gxh/zlb/zcwj/t24782.htm [13.01.11] 
 
 
Moseley, Alexander, „Political Realism‟, The Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
http://www.iep.utm.edu/polreal/ [13.01.11] 
 
 
MSNBC,  French pol says boycott Olympics over Darfur, March 22
nd
 2007  
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17727654/  [13.01.11] 
 
 
69 
 
Myanmar Directorate of Trade (2009) Statistics 
http://www.commerce.gov.mm/eng/dot/statistics.html [13.01.11] 
 
 
Nesikry, Martin, Spokesperson for UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon, Myanmar polls 
insufficiently inclusive, participatory and transparent, Secretary-General says, Nov. 8
th
  2010 
http://www.un.org/News/ossg/hilites/hilites_arch_view.asp?HighID=1751 [03.12.10] 
 
 
倪建平,  对外传播与“和平崛起”：国家形象塑造的视角,  人民网，2005 年 7 月 8 日  
[Ni, Jianping, The spreading of  information to foreign nations and „peaceful rise‟: From the 
perspective of forming national image, Renmin net, July 8
th
  2005] 
http://media.people.com.cn/GB/22114/50600/50604/3529068.html [15.01.11] 
 
 
Norwegian Nobel Committee (The), Announcement: The Nobel Peace Prize for 2010 
http://nobelpeaceprize.org/en_GB/announce-2010/ [13.01.11] 
 
 
 
Oslo center for Peace and Human Rights (The), The elections in Burma will be a farce 
(2010), Aug. 13
th
 2010 
http://www.oslocenter.no/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=252&Itemid=44, 
[13.01.11] 
 
 
Poon Kim Shee ‖The Political Economy of China-Myanmar Relations: Strategic and 
Economic Dimensions‖, Ritsumeikan Annual Review of International Studies, Vol.1 2002. pp. 
33-53,  The International Studies Association of Ritsumeikan University: 
    
 
Reuters, EU should boycott Beijing Olympics over Myanmar, Sept 27
th
 2007 
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL2759374820070927 [13.01.11] 
 
 
Reuters, China casts nervous eye at erstwhile ally Myanmar, Jan 25
th
  2010 
www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE60O01120100125   [13.01.11] 
 
 
Risa, Trond, China‟s Foreign Policy in the Case of the Conflict in Darfur, Master Thesis, 
University of Oslo, 2009  
 
 
Rüth, Gunnar, ―Contemporary Sino-Burmese Relations: A Return to Tribute Diplomacy?― 
Asienhaus Essen, no 4. 2005   
 
 
Sai Wansai, Ethnic Conflict in Burma: Historical Formation, Cause of Conflict and 
Contemporary Politics, Boxun – Peacehall, Jan 4th 2004  
http://www.peacehall.com/news/gb/english/2004/01/200401270544.shtml  [15.01.11] 
70 
 
 
 
Selth, Andrew,  ―Chinese Military Bases in Burma: The Explosion of a Myth‖, Regional 
Outlook Paper No. 10, 2007 
 
 
Setkyar Hein, The United Nations has a duty, Burma Digest, July 25
th
, 2007 
http://burmadigest.wordpress.com/2007/07/25/the-united-nations-has-a-duty/ 
[13.01.11] 
 
 
Spencer, Richard,  China‟s Dilemma over Burma prostests, The Telegraph, Sept 26th 2007  
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1564251/Chinas-dilemma-over-Burma-
protests.html  [13.01.11] 
 
 
Stanford Encyclopedia of philosophy,  Sovereignty 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sovereignty/ [13.01.11] 
 
 
Tang, James Dr., ―With the grain or against the grain? Energy security and Chinese foreign 
policy in the Hu Jintao era‖, The Brookings institution Centre for Northeast Asian Policy 
Studies, Oct. 2006 http://www.brookings.edu/fp/cnaps/papers/tang2006.pdf [03.12.10] 
 
 
Thaung Tun, Priorities in Myanmar Foreign Policy 2004, Bangladesh Strategic and 
Development Forum Aug.12
th
 2004 http://www.bdsdf.org/forum/index.php?showtopic=3669  
[13.01.11] 
 
 
Tint Swe, Not second election but second conference for Burma, Burma digest, Nov. 1
st
 2010 
http://burmadigest.info/2010/11/01/not-second-election-but-second-conference-for-burma/ 
[13.01.11] 
 
 
United Nations, Meetings conducted / Actions taken by the Security Council 
http://www.un.org/depts/dhl/resguide/scact.htm [03.12.10] 
 
 
United Nations,  Record of vetos in the UNSC pre-2004, (annex III) 
http://daccess-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/417/02/PDF/N0441702.pdf?OpenElement 
[03.12.10] 
 
United Nations,  Security Council 5757
th
 Meeting (PM) - Security Council deplores violence 
used against Myanmar demonstrators, Oct. 11
th
  2007 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9139.doc.htm [05.11.10] 
 
 
United Nations,  Security Council Draft Resolution, Jan. 12
th
 2007  
http://www.undemocracy.com/S-2007-14.pdf [03.12.10] 
71 
 
 
 
United Nations Human Rights Council, 5
th
 Special Session, Resolution S-5/1: Situation of 
Human Rights in Myanmar , Oct. 2
nd
 2007 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/category,POLICY,UNHRC,,,470b4e912,0.html [03.12.10] 
 
 
United Nations Human Rights Council (webcast) - Fifth special session, Resolution S-5/1:  
The Situation of Human Rights in Myanmar, Oct. 2
nd
  2007 -  
http://www.un.org/webcast/unhrc/archive.asp?go=015  
[03.12.10] 
 
 
US Departement of State (2010) Background note - Burma 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35910.htm 
[13.01.11] 
 
 
Von Hartenberg, Donata – A marriage of (in)convenience, Al-Jazeera, Nov 10th 2010 
http://english.aljazeera.net/indepth/features/2010/11/20101177295381477.html [15.01.11]  
 
 
Vang, Pobzeb, 2008, Five principles of Chinese foreign policies, Author House, 
Bloomington; Indiana 
 
 
Vaughn, Bruce and Morrison, Wayne M. ―China-Southeast Asia Relations:Trends, Issues, 
and Implications for the United States‖, Congressional Research Service Report, April 4th 
2006 
 
 
Voice of America, Darfur activists prepare for a possible Beijing Olympics boycott , June 
25
th
  2007   
http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/africa/a-13-Darfur-Activists-Prepare-For-Possible-
Beijing-Olympics-Boycott.html  [13.01.11] 
 
 
Wade, Francis (2010) Concern greets new Security Council arrivals, Democratic Voice of 
Burma, Oct.14
th
 2010  
http://www.dvb.no/news/concern-greets-new-security-council-arrivals/12222 [13.01.11] 
 
Wai Moe, Chinese Premier coming to Burma, The Irrawaddy, May 20
th
 2010 
http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=18509 [13.01.11] 
 
 
Wai Moe, Fighting stops as Kokang Surrender Arms to Chinese, The Irrawaddy Aug. 29
th
 
2009  http://www.irrawaddy.org/highlight.php?art_id=16667  [13.01.11] 
 
 
72 
 
Wang, Guangya, Security Council Meeting 5619 : The Situation in Myanmar, United Nations 
Jan 12
th
 2007 http://www.undemocracy.com/securitycouncil/meeting_5619 [03.12.10] 
 
 
Wang, Vincent Wei-Cheng, The logic of China-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement: Economic 
Statecraft of „Peaceful Rise‟. Presented at „China in the World, the World in China‘, 
International Conference University of Malay, Aug. 2007. 
http://web.rollins.edu/~tlairson/mba/chinaaseanfta2.pdf [02.12.10] 
 
 
王子昌, ”2010年缅甸大选与缅甸外交”, 东南亚研究 2010年第4期 
[Wang, Zichang, ‖The 2010 Burmese general elections and Burmese foreign policy‖, 
Southeast Asian Studies, vol 4. 2010]  
 
 
Washington Post,  China‟s muscular embrace of Cambodia, Nov 20th 2010 
http://www.latestchina.com/article/?rid=23228   [15.01.11] 
 
 
Washington Post, Zambian Hopeful Takes a Swing at China, Sept. 25
th
 2006 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/09/24/AR2006092400915.html?
nav=rss_world/africa  [03.12.10] 
 
 
Wen, Liao, ―China‘s Black Cat, White Cat Diplomacy‖, Foreign Policy Magazine,  July 2009 
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/07/10/chinas_black_cat_white_cat_diplomacy?p
age=0,0  [13.01.11] 
 
 
Wong, Ola En kinesisk by – i hjertet av Zambia, Bistandsaktuelt, Oct. 2nd 2009 
http://www.bistandsaktuelt.no/Nyheter+og+reportasjer/Arkiv+nyheter+og+reportasjer/13524
6.cms [13.01.11] 
 
    
吴宝晓, ”清季藩属观念调适与边疆政策变化”, 清史研究，2002年第 3期 
[Wu Bao Xiao, ‖Adjustments in the concept of vassal states  and changes in border areas 
policy during late Qing‖, Studies in Qing History, vol 3. 2002]   
 
Xinhua，China-ASEAN Free Trade Area sets example for mutual beneficial,win-win 
regional co-op, Jan. 1
st
 2010 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2010-01/01/content_12741761.htm [13.01.11] 
 
新华网, 江泽民在中国共产党第十五次全国代表大会上的报告, 1997年 9月 12日 
[Xinhua, Jiang Zemin‟s speech at the 15th Party Congress, Sept. 12th 1997] 
http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2003-01/20/content_697207.htm [13.01.11] 
 
 
 
73 
 
新华网, 周恩来总理九次访问缅甸, 2001 年 12 月 
[Xinhua,  Premier Zhou Enlai visited Burma nine times, Dec. 2001]  
http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2001-12/12/content_158759.htm   [13.01.11] 
 
 
Yang, Jiechi, Shape the Future of Asia Pacific with Confidence and Cooperation, Address by 
Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi at the First Lanting Forum, Dec. 1
st
 2010 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t773516.htm [13.01.11] 
 
 
Yang Ying, China's Soft Power and Its National Image, 2007, Paper presented at the annual 
meeting of the International Studies Association 48th Annual Convention, Hilton Chicago 
 
 
Yuan, Jing Dong,  ‖China-ASEAN relations: Perspectives, Prospects and implications for U.S 
interests‖, Strategic Studies Instititute,U.S Army War College, Oct. 2006  
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB735.pdf 
[03.12.10] 
 
岳德明, “冷战后缅甸对华政策刍议”, 外交评论，2005年 8月总第 83期 
[Yue Deming, ―Opinions on Burmese policies towards China after the cold war‖, Foreign 
Affairs Review, vol. 83, Aug. 2005] 
 
 
张洁, ―中国能源安全中的马六甲因素‖ ,  国际政治研究, 2005 年第 3 期  
[ Zhang Jie, ―The Malacca Strait factor for China‘s energy security”, International Political 
Studies, No 3. 2005] 
 
 
张哲馨, ‖中缅外交政策新趋势与中缅关系新发展‖，国家展望, 2009 年 02 期  
[Zhang, Zhexin, ―New Trends in Sino-Burmese foreign policy and the new development of 
Sino-Burmese relations‖, Global Review, No 2. 2009] 
 
 
Zhao,  Suisheng (ed), 2004, Chinese Foreign Policy: pragmatism and strategic behaviour, 
M.E Sharpe, Armont;New York  
 
 
朱振明，”中国的睦邻外交与中缅关系”，东南亚南亚研究，2009年第 2期 
[Zhu, Zhenming, ―China‘s good-neighbour policy and Sino-Burmese relations‖, Southeast 
and South Asian Studies, no.2, 2009 
 
 
Zoellick, Robert B.  From the Shanghai Communique to “Responsible Stakeholder” -  
Peterson Institute, May 2
nd
  2007  
http://www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.cfm?ResearchID=733 [03.12.10] 
 
 
